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Chapter 19 of the United States-Canada
Free Trade Agreement 1989-95: A
Check on Administered Protection?
John M. Mercury*
INTRODUCTION
The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement1 expressed the
mutual desire of Canadian and American exporters to secure perma-
nent access to the other country's market. Of particular concern to
Canada during the FTA negotiations was the perceived need to re-
duce the impact of such non-tariff barriers to trade as American an-
tidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) laws.2 It was
* B.A. Northwestern (1990), M.A. Yale (1995), is an LL.B. candidate at the University of
Toronto. For their invaluable assistance in the preparation of this study, the author is deeply
indebted to Professor Michael J. Trebilcock, Director of the Law and Economics Program and
Chairperson of the International Business and Trade Law Program at the University of Toronto
Faculty of Law, and Mr. James R. Holbein, U.S. Secretary of the NAFTA Secretariat and former
U.S. Secretary of the FTA Binational Secretariat. For their comments on earlier drafts of this
article, the author would like thank Kevin Kordana, Chris Thomas, and Professors Michael Reis-
man, Andreas Lowenfeld, Hudson Janisch, Harold Koh, Robert Howse, Robert Hudec, and
Murray Smith. For their assistance with research materials, the author would like to thank Judy
Wilson, Connie Crosby, Richard Dube, Esther Wan, Cathy Beehan, Robert Lalonde, Cecille
Raymond, Richard Lane, Glen Robinson, Murray Jackson, Sarah Pike, Andrew Belier, Mar-
garet Chisholm, Dan Wade, Fred Shapiro, Adam Cowles, Tom Fine and Susan Barker.
1 United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, Jan. 2,1988,27 I.L.M. 281 (1988) (hereinaf-
ter "FTA"). The FTA was implemented in the United States by the United States-Canada Free-
Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (noted at 19
U.S.C. § 2112 (1988)).
2 The perception in Canada that the United States government had excessively used differ-
ent forms of "contingent protection" to protect domestic industry from unfavorable foreign com-
petition appears to have been justified. Between 1980 and 1988, twenty-two antidumping cases
and eleven countervailing duty cases were initiated against Canadian exports, resulting in the
application of definitive duties in nine and six of these cases respectively. However, during the
same period, Canada was an even more frequent utilizer of its trade remedy regime. Between
1980 and 1988, Canada initiated fifty AD and one CVD action(s) against United States exports,
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recognized that eliminating tariff levels under the FTA would only
nominally benefit Canadian exporters if American non-tariff barriers
were allowed to retain their existing status.3 Chapter 19 of the FTA
was created to address this Canadian concern.
The FTA Chapter 19 system provided for review by five-member
panels4 of antidumping, countervailing duty, and material injury de-
terminations made by one party respecting goods of the other party.5
Chapter 19 allowed both Canada and the United States to retain their
domestic trade remedy laws,6 and provided that cases would be re-
viewed under the domestic law of the country whose agency made the
final determination in dispute.7 Chapter 19 also established a detailed
set of rules and deadlines for panel review,' a Code of Conduct for
panelists,9 and an "Extraordinary Challenge Committee" that would
be available in exceptional circumstances to review a binational panel
decision.10
Nearly all of the 49 cases initiated under Chapter 19 of the FTA
have been completed and, as such, it is now possible to draw some
resulting in the application of definitive duties in twenty-four and one case(s) respectively. The
United States data was gathered from the United States Department of Commerce International
Trade Administration Central Records Unit: "Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Actions for
all cases active on or after January 1, 1980: A Federal Register History Current Through August,
1994." The Canadian data was collected with the assistance of Mr. Richard Lane and Mr. John
MacKay, Revenue Canada Customs Excise and Taxation: Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Division.
3 Canada actually sought complete exemption from U.S. AD/CVD laws and fought to cre-
ate an alternative body of trade rules that would apply equally between the two countries.
Chapter 19 was a compromise solution that arose when the U.S. refused to grant Canada such an
exemption. See William K. Ince & Michele C. Sherman, Binational Panel Reviews Under Article
19 of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement: A Novel Approach to International Dispute Resolu-
tion, 37 FED. B. Nnws & J. 136, 137-38 (1990).
4 During the FTA, panelists were appointed on an ad hoc basis from a roster of 25 candi-
dates prepared by each country. See FTA, supra note 1, Annex 1901(2).
5 FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904.
6 FTA, supra note 1, art. 1902.
7 FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(2). Antidumping and countervailing duty investigations in
the United States are made by the International Trade Administration (ITA), while injury deter-
minations are made by the International Trade Commission (ITC). Final ITA and ITC determi-
nations can be appealed to the Court of International Trade (CIT), and then further to the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). In Canada, Revenue Canada (RC) is responsible
for AD/CVD determinations, while the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) investi-
gates injury. In Canada, the applicable adjudicatory bodies are the Federal Court of Canada and
the Federal Court of Appeals.
8 FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(14).
9 The FTA Code of Conduct For Proceedings Under Chapter 18 and 19 of the Canada-US
Free Trade Agreement was established pursuant to FTA, supra note 1, art. 1910. The Code was
published at 123 Can. Gazette 1 96, art. 11 (1989).
10 FTA, supra note 1, annex 1904.13 (hereinafter "ECC").
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conclusions as to how this hybrid dispute settlement system performed
over the past five years.11 From the perspective of Canadian export-
ers, Chapter 19 binational panel review appears to have provided an
effective, albeit limited, remedy to the application of U.S. trade rem-
edy laws by inducing a more disciplined administration of those laws.
By contrast, from an American exporter's perspective, the FTA Chap-
ter 19 system has failed to provide substantive relief from injurious
Canadian agency determinations. This asymmetry in results, and,
more important, the way in which Canadian panelists have examined
certain United States agency final determinations, have together
caused significant controversy in the United States. This disquiet was
the direct catalyst behind changes to the binational panel process dur-
ing the recent North American Free Trade Agreement12 negotiations.
During the FTA, Chapter 19 panel decisions were largely well
reasoned, thoroughly researched, professionally administered and
rarely divided along national lines.13 Further, FTA Chapter 19 cases
were resolved expeditiously, and decisions did not serve to create a
body of trade law jurisprudence divergent from that which existed in
either Canada or the U.S.. Nevertheless, the general enthusiasm that
accompanied the Chapter 19 process during its early years may be
waning in Canada and the United States alike. Because of recent
11 Of the 49 requests for binational panel review, 32 cases have been completed with deci-
sions delivered, 13 cases were terminated at the joint request of the participants before an initial
decision was delivered, two cases are still active with four decisions issued, and two cases have
been stayed indefinitely pending the resolution of related CIT litigation. The data used in this
Study was obtained from various sources, including the Status Report that is issued monthly by
the NAFTA Secretariat(s) in Ottawa and Washington, as well as notices published in the Federal
Register and the Canada Gazette. The data is current as of July 1, 1995, and all calculations in
this Study were made in reference to that date.
12 See The North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United
States, the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Mexican States, done
Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 605 (1993) (hereinafter "NAFTA").
13 During the FTA years, there was a general consensus among commentators that the qual-
ity of Chapter 19 decisions was high. See, eg., Judith Bello et al., Midterm Report on Binational
Dispute Settlement Under the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, 25 INT'L LAw. 489
(1991); David Huntington, Settling Disputes under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 34
HARv. INT'L LJ. 407 (1993); Homer E. Moyer, Chapter 19 of the NAFTA: Binational Panels as
the Trade Courts of Last Resort, 27 INT'L LAW. 707 (1993); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Binational
Dispute Settlement Under Chapter 19 of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement An
Interim Appraisal, 24 N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & PoL 269 (1991); William C. Graham, Dispute Resolu-
tion in the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement One Element of a Complex Relationship,
37 McGrLL LJ. 544 (1992); Gary Horlick and F. Amanda DeBusk, Dispute Resolution Panels of
the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement The First Two and One-half Years, 37 McGnLL LJ. 574
(1992); and J. Robichaud and D. Steger, Chapter 19 of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
The First Five Years (Paper prepared for a Symposium on International Trade, Universidad Na-
cional Autonoma de Mexico, Mexico City, Mexico (October 18, 1993) (on file with author).
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changes to Chapter 19 under NAFTA, this binational "experiment" in
coming years may come to resemble more the traditional system of
judicial review which Chapter 19's hybrid model of adjudication and
arbitration was intended to replace. Such a development could harm
the interests of competitive North American exporters as administer-
ing agencies would once again wield broad discretionary powers in the
interpretation and application of complex trade remedy laws. The
parties to NAFTA must immediately strengthen their commitment to
creating a new system that will permanently resolve the commercial
uncertainty and market distortions caused by protectionist trade rem-
edy laws.
The principal objective of this Study is to demonstrate that Chap-
ter 19 under the FTA - while bedeviled by a few minor procedural
imperfections - disproportionately advanced the interests of Cana-
dian exporters over that of their United States counterparts, and that
the asymmetry in results was largely attributable to (i) disparate
"standards of judicial review," and (ii) a firm commitment on the part
of panelists to formulate and consistently apply an unyielding version
of the United States standard to U.S. agency final determinations.
Part I of the Study begins by examining the aggregate statistics pro-
duced by Chapter 19 panel review during the FTA. Part II considers
certain Chapter 19 cases reviewing Canadian agency final determina-
tions and provides an analysis of the most salient cases brought
against United States agencies. Part III analyzes changes to Chapter
19 under NAFrA, and suggests that the positive aspects of Chapter 19
binational panel review during the FA may be diluted in coming
years because of these alterations.
I. THE CHAPR 19 EXPERIENCE: 1989-9514
This Part examines the aggregate statistics that have been pro-
vided by the thirty cases where FTA binational panels rendered deci-
sions. The data demonstrate that: (i) Canadian exporters realized
substantial reductions in duties following appeal to binational panels
while U.S. exporters enjoyed no such success; (ii) panel opinions were
often unanimously delivered; (iii) panel "remand" procedures limited
somewhat the effectiveness of Chapter 19 panel review; and (iv) the
suspension of binational panel review due to the withdrawal of panel-
14 The FTA was superseded by NAFTA on January 1, 1994. However, for the purposes of
NAFTA Chapter 19, Article 1906 provided that any FTA Chapter 19 case initiated prior to the
implementation of NAFTA would be reviewed after January 1, 1994 by way of the Chapter 19
rules and procedures as contained in the FTA.
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ists is a growing problem which may have been exacerbated by recent
developments.
A. Canadian Exporters: Disproportionate Beneficiaries?
The Chapter 19 process has clearly advanced the interests of Ca-
nadian exporters as seen on Chart One on the following page.
Chart One supports a finding that Canadian exporters enjoyed
greater success under Chapter 19 than did their U.S. counterparts. Of
the fourteen matters where panels reviewed ITA final determinations,
panel decisions effectively forced the ITA to reduce or remove duties
in nine instances. For Canadian exporters this result represents a sub-
stantial improvement over appeal to the CIT, which overturned
agency determinations less frequently.'
5
The reduction of duties in nine out of fourteen AD/CVD cases is
a significant accomplishment for Canadian exporters. Yet the question
that must be asked is to what degree are duties being reduced in ITA
redeterminations? Only substantial reductions in duty levels, espe-
cially for smaller exporters, would offset the costs associated with
binational panel litigation.
Reductions in duty levels were large. If one compares initial du-
ties (final agency determinations) with post-panel review agency rede-
terminations, it is clear that panels found in most cases that the ITA
improperly calculated a significant portion of the duty in its final
determination.
The magnitude of this "misapplication" of U.S. trade remedy law
by the ITA depends on the case in question. According to the data,
the percentage of the initial duty that was applied by the ITA in viola-
tion of domestic law was, on average, 28.20%.
While the 28.20% average reduction represents only an estimate
of the success enjoyed by Canadians to date, the number is a fairly
accurate indicator of what has transpired since January 1, 1989. This
number may, if anything, underestimate the overall success realized by
15 On average, panels remanded final determinations in a greater proportion of cases than
did the CIT over the same period of time. During the period 1989-1994, the CIT remanded
about 1/3 of its cases. In contrast, Chapter 19 panels reviewing U.S. agency determinations re-
manded about 2/3 of the time. See United States General Accounting Office, U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement: Factors Contributing to Controversy in Appeals of Trade Remedy Cases to
Binational Panels, (GAO/GGD-95-175 BR), Washington D.C., June 16, 1995, p.75 (hereinafter
"GAO Study").
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CHART ONE
CHANGES iN DUTY LEVELS FOLLOWING PANEL REVIEW'
6
CASES BROUGHT AGAINST THE ITA
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NEw STEEL RAnIs (AD) 38.79
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ii.) for all other live swine Cdn $ .04491LB
LIVE SWINE (CVD 91-1904-04) -
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i.) for all other live swine Cdn $ .0932
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16 Unless otherwise specified, all duty levels are weighted average duty levels. As such, one
must keep in mind that while a weighted average antidumping duty may have decreased
following binational panel review for the industry as a whole, petitioning companies with a small
volume of imports may not have benefited from this reduction in the average duty level.
17 There were actually two challenges brought in this case. While Paving Equipment USA-
89-1904-03 challenged the amount of the antidumping duty, Canadian exporters argued in
Paving Equipment USA-89-1904-02 that the subject exports should not have been included
within the scope of the ITA's antidumping order. The latter case has not been listed in the above
chart because it did not directly challenge the calculation of an antidumping or countervailing
duty level.
18 The reduction in the countervailing duty in Pork eventually reached 100% when the ITC
reversed its affirmative material injury finding.
19 When determining the average change in weighted average duty levels resulting from
panel review, this calculation was made without reference to the reduction in duties in Red
Raspberries, because of the fact that no weighted average post-panel review antidumping duty
level could be calculated in that case. Also, each product under review in the Live Swine cases
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Canadian exporters, in real dollar terms. This is because some of the
products which have realized above-average reductions in duties -
Softwood Lumber2 0 (one hundred percent of CVD removed) and
Pork"' (fifty-five percent of CVD removed) - constitute a larger per-
centage of Canadian exports to the United States than some of the
other products listed in Chart One. Canadian softwood lumber ex-
ports to the United States are roughly $8 billion/yr.22 Recently, ex-
ports of Canadian pork to the U.S. were estimated at $350 million
annually.
23
In stark contrast to their Canadian counterparts, American ex-
porters challenging Revenue Canada final antidumping determina-
tions enjoyed no success under Chapter 19 of the FTA. With respect
to American exporters appealing final Revenue Canada antidumping
determinations, Beer24 is illustrative of the approach that Chapter 19
panels employed. In that case, three American brewers were found to
have dumped beer in British Columbia at rates of 33.6% (Heileman),
15.06% (Stroh's) and 14.9% (Pabst) respectively. The weighted aver-
age AD was found to be 29.8%. Following appeal to a Chapter 19
binational panel, not only were duties maintained for Pabst and
Stroh's, but they were actually increased for Heileman to 34.1%. Rev-
enue Canada's recalculation resulted in a new weighted average an-
tidumping duty of 30%.25
Similar outcomes resulted in the three other cases where panels
reviewed final Revenue Canada antidumping determinations. In
was treated as a separate case, as it was difficult in those situations to determine a weighted
average duty level.
20 Certain Softwood Products from Canada, No. USA-92-1904-01, 2 N.Am. Free Trade
Agreements: Disp. Settlement (Oceana), Booklets B.20A, B.20B (Dec. 17, 1993) (hereinafter
"Softwood Lumber").
21 Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada, No. USA-89-1904-06, 1 N. Am. Free Trade
Agreements: Disp. Settlement (Oceana), Booklets B.10A, B.10B (Sept. 28, 1990) (hereinafter
"Pork-CVD").
22 John Schreiner, U.S. Lumber Industry Plans Another Duty Fight, THm FrNANCAL Post,
July 12, 1995, at 3.
23 Gary N. Horlick and F. Amanda DeBusk, The Functioning of U.S. - Canada Free Trade
Agreement Dispute Settlement Panels, Appendix One, page 1 (Sept. 1, 1991), (unpublished
manuscript, O'Melveny and Myers, Washington, D.C.).
24 In the Matter of Certain Beer Originating in or Exported from the United States of
America by G. Heilman Brewing Company Inc., Pabst Brewing Company and the Stroh Brew-
ery Company for Use or Consumption in the Province of British Columbia, Memorandum Opin-
ion and Order No. CDA-91-1904-01, 2 N. Am. Free Trade Agreements: Disp. Settlement
(Oceana), Booklet B.16 (Aug. 6, 1992) (hereinafter "Beer-Dumping").
25 Statistics gathered from Revenue Canada officials (Jan. 1995).
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Tufted Carpets-AD26 an initial 11.97% duty was increased to 13.23%
as a consequence of panel review. In Gypsum Board27 duties were
raised on American exports from 27.28% to 36.06% following Chap-
ter 19 review. Finally, in Cold Rolled Carbon Steel Sheet,28 Revenue
Canada's recalculation of its original 8.3% antidumping duty resulted
in no increase or decrease in the weighted average duty level. Ameri-
can exporters are undoubtably disappointed with these results.
Turning to an examination of final "injury" determinations, we
see that both Canadian and U.S. exporters were relatively unsuccess-
ful in overturning final injury determinations. Chart Two illustrates
this phenomenon.
In theory, successful appeal of an injury determination would be
more important than a successful margin of dumping or unfair subsidi-
zation challenge. A panel finding that an affirmative injury determi-
nation had violated domestic law would result in the immediate
removal of all antidumping and countervailing duties, and a refund of
amounts paid in association with those penalties. On the other hand,
a relatively successful AD or CVD case - as in Pork-CVD 29 where
duties were reduced by fifty-five percent - will not result in the imme-
diate refund of duties, but only in a reduction in those duty levels.
The injury phase of Pork3 shows the advantages of challenging
both CVD and injury determinations before binational panels. Pork-
CVD31 was important in that it effectively forced the ITA to conclude
that certain government programs were not "de facto specific" and
thus not "countervailable."32 Yet Pork33 proved to be even more sig-
26 In the Matter of Final Determination of Dumping Made by Revenue Canada, Customs
and Excise, Regarding Certain Machine lufted Carpeting Originating in or Exported from the
United States of America, Opinion and Panel Decision, No. CDA-92-1904-01, 2 N. Am. Free
Trade Agreements: Disp. Settlement (Oceana), Booklet B.25.A, B.25B (May 19, 1993) (herein-
after "Tufted Carpets-AD").
27 In the Matter of the Final Determination of Dumping Made by the Deputy Minister of
National Revenue, Customs and Excise, regarding Gypsum Board Originating in or Exported
from the United States of America, No. CDA-93-1904-01, 2 N. Am. Free Trade Agreements:
Disp. Settlement (Oceana), Booklet B.27A (Nov. 17, 1993) (hereinafter "Gypsum Board").
28 In Re Cold-Rolled Steel Sheet, Panel No. CDA-93-1904-08, 1995 FTAPD Lexis 4 (Jan. 1,
1995).
29 Pork-CVD, supra note 21.
30 In the Matter of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada, Memorandum Opinion
and Order regarding ITC's determination on remand, No. USA-89-1904-11, 1 N. Am. Free
Trade Agreements: Disp. Settlement (Oceana), Booklets B.8A, B.8B (Jan. 22,1991) (hereinafter
"Pork").
31 Pork-CVD, supra note 21.
32 The ITA will find a subsidy as countervailable if it is either 'de jure' or 'de facto' specific.
For a more complete discussion of the "specificity" test see infra pages 580-583.
33 Pork, supra note 30.
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CHART Two
PANEL REVIEW OF INJURY CASES
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nificant in that its result effectively ordered the removal of all duties.
As a result of Pork, the automatic removal of duties on the Canadian
exports would have been ordered regardless of the outcome of Pork-
CVD. Thus while exporters may appeal both AD/CVD and injury
determinations to binational panel review, securing a victory on an
injury determination is most critical to one's interests.
A brief examination of the injury cases illustrates that Canadian
exporters enjoyed little success when challenging ITC final determina-
tions. Canadian exporters were successful in challenging ITC final de-
terminations in Pork3 4 and appeared likely to succeed in Softwood
34 Pork supra note 30.
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Lumber35 before proceedings in that case were stayed. 6 However,
Canadian exporters during the FTA were unsuccessful in challenging
affirmative injury determinations in New Steel Rails,37 Magnesium,38
and Flat Rolled Carbon Steel Products.
39
American petitioners were universally unsuccessful in appealing
final affirmative injury determinations. In Induction Motors,40 the
panel's affirmation of a CITT finding led to the maintenance of a 14%
antidumping duty. In Beer,4 1 the panel's approval of the CITT's in-
jury determination translated into the perpetuation of a weighted-av-
erage thirty percent duty. In Tufted Carpets from the U.S.42 and Cold
35 Softwood Lumber from Canada, No. USA-92-1904-02, 2 N. Am. Free Trade Agreements:
Disp. Settlement (Oceana), Booklets B.21A, B.21B and B.21C (hereinafter "Lumber-Injury").
36 By August 4, 1994, the binational panel in Lumber-Injury had remanded to the ITC three
times, rejecting the ITC's assertion that price suppression by the subject Canadian imports had
caused material injury to the U.S. industry. On August 3, 1994, the Softwood Lumber counter-
vailing duty challenge was terminated, following an Extraordinary Challenge Committee's ap-
proval of the panel's second opinion. A 6.51% CVD was thereafter ordered removed from
Canadian imports of softwood lumber. The removal of the CVD rendered the outcome of the
injury case moot, and a stay was issued in Lumber-Injury. The case was officially terminated on
January 27, 1995.
37 In the Matter of New Steel Rails from Canada, Opinion of the Panel, Nos. USA-89-1904-
09, USA-89-1904-10, 1 N. Am. Free Trade Agreements: Disp. Settlement (Oceana), Booklet
B.7 at 7 (Aug. 13, 1990) (hereinafter "New Steel Rails"). In this case the panel was less demand-
ing of the ITC than it was in other cases. This was one of the few times during the FTA where
the Chapter 19 panel's examination of the ITC final determination failed to address the issue of
whether there was a rational connection between the evidence relied on and the conclusion
reached by the administering agency. For a more detailed examination of this panel decision,
See THOMAS M. BODDEZ & MICHAEL J. TREBiLcoCK, U~INIsH-r, BusINESS: REFORMING
TRADE REMEDY LAWS IN NORTH AMERICA 117-23 (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1993).
38 In the Matter of Pure and Alloy Magnesium from Canada, Final Decison of the Panel,
USA-92-1904-06, 2 N. Am. Free Trade Agreements: Disp. Settlement (Oceana), Booklet B.24B
at 13 (Jan. 27, 1994).
39 In the Matter of Certain Flat-Rolled Carbon Steel Products from Canada, No. USA-93-
1904-05, 2 N. Am. Free Trade Agreements: Disp. Settlement (Oceana), Booklet B.33 (Nov. 4,
1994).
40 In the Matter of Certain Dumped Integral Horsepower Induction Motors, No. CDA-90-
1904-01, 1 N.Am. Free Trade Agreements: Disp. Settlement (Oceana), Booklet B.12 (Sept. 11,
1991) (hereinafter "Induction Motors").
41 In the Matter of Certain Beer Originating in or Exported from the United States of
America by or on behalf of G. Heilman Brewing Company Inc., Pabst Brewing Company and
the Stroh Brewery Company for Use or Consumption in the Province of British Columbia, No.
CDA-91-1904-02, 2 N. Am. Free Trade Agreements: Disp. Settlement (Oceana), Booklet B.14A,
B.14B (Aug. 26, 1992) (hereinafter "Beer").
42 In the Matter of an Inquiry made by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Pursuant
to Section 42 of the Special Import Measures Act Respecting Machine bfted Carpeting
Originating in or Exported from the United States of America, No. CDA-92-1904-02, 2 N. Am.
Free Trade Agreements: Disp. Settlement (Oceana), Booklets B.26A, B.26B, B.26C (April 7,
1993) (hereinafter "Tufted Carpets").
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Rolled Steel Sheet,43 American petitioners once again failed to have
the panel force reversal of injury determinations. This time the level
of ADs that were maintained was 13.23% 44 and 8.3% respectively.
Finally, in Pipe Fittings,45 American exporters failed to secure any re-
lief from a 47% antidumping duty when the binational panel unani-
mously upheld a CITr affirmative injury determination.
Apart from Tufted Carpets, the cases of Flat Hot-Rolled Carbon
Steel Sheet Products46 and Flat Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Plate47 are the
only other cases decided since the FTA's inception which appear to
have benefited U.S. exporters. In those cases, two Canadian steel
companies challenged the CT's finding that the subject U.S. imports
had not caused and were not causing material injury to the Canadian
industry. In both instances, Chapter 19 panels upheld the CITT's con-
clusions. While these decisions assisted U.S. exporters by preventing
Revenue Canada from applying antidumping duties to their products,
Chapter 19 panels continued their practice of affirming CITr final
determinations.
To summarize, FTA Chapter 19 panel review asymmetrically ben-
efited Canadian exporters in their efforts to remove non-tariff barriers
to trade. While panels for the most part upheld ITC final injury deter-
minations, they routinely found under the FTA that the ITA had mis-
applied U.S. AD/CVD law. These findings, in turn, corresponded
directly to reductions in duty levels for Canadian exporters. At the
same time, panels found that both Revenue Canada and the CITr had
properly interpreted and applied Canadian trade remedy law. As a
43 In the Matter of Certain Cold-Rolled Steel Sheet Originating in or Exported from the
United States of America (Injury), No. CDA-93-1904-09, 2 N. Am. Free Trade Agreements:
Disp. Settlement (Oceana), Booklet B.30 (July 13,1994) (hereinafter "Cold Rolled Steel Sheet").
44 In Tufted Carpets, supra note 42, the panel's affirmation of the CITr's "threat of material
injury" determination led to the maintenance of the 13.23% duty. However, in its redetermina-
tions on remand, the CITr reversed its "past and present" material injury determination. This
reversal led to a partial refund of duties for the petitioning U.S. exporters.
45 In the Matter of Certain Solder Joint Pressure Pipe Fittings and Solder Joint Drainage,
Waste and Vent Pipe Fittings, Made of Cast Copper Alloy, Wrought Copper Alloy or Wrought
Copper, Originating in or Exported from the USA, Memorandum Opinion & Order, No. CDA-
93-1904-11 2 N. Am. Free Trade Agreements: Disp. Settlement (Oceana), Booklet B.35 (Feb.
13, 1995) (hereinafter "Pipe Fittings").
46 In the Matter of Certain Flat Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Sheet Products Originating In or
Exported from the United States of America, No. CDA-93-1904-07, 2 N. Am. Free Trade
Agreements: Disp. Settlement (Oceana), Booklet B.28A. (May 18 1994) (hereinafter "Hot
Rolled Steel Sheet").
47 In the Matter of Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Plate and High-Strength Low-Alloy
Plate, Heat-Treated or not, Originating in or Exported from the U.S.A., No. CDA-93-1904-06 2
N. Am. Free Trade Agreement: Disp. Settlement (Oceana), Booklet B.34 (Dec. 20, 1994) (here-
inafter "Hot Rolled Steel Plate").
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result, U.S. exporters realized neither reductions in duty levels, nor
reversal of final injury determinations. Part II of this Study will at-
tempt to explain why this disparity in results took place.
B. The Composition Of Panel Opinions
The aggregate statistics of FTA Chapter 19 panel review also
shed some light on the composition of panel opinions. Has there been
a discernible correlation between the nationality of panelists and the
positions which they have taken in the resulting panel opinion(s)?
CHART THREE (A)





















































The dissenting Canadian panelist
argued that the ITA had applied the
wrong standard of review when
calculating dumping margins by way of
"best information available".
One American panelist issued a
statement of "additional views" in
which he suggested how the ITA could
best perform its "specificity" analysis.
One Canadian panelist issued
"additional views" in which he
criticized the ITC for producing an
unreasoned final determination.










































































One U.S. panelist issued additional
views suggesting that the panel remand
order was too demanding.
The U.S. panelist dissented arguing that
the panel majority had applied the
wrong standard of review.
The two American panelists dissented,
arguing that the Canadian majority had
applied the wrong standard of review.
One American and one Canadian
panelist dissented from the majority's
refusal to remand one issue to the ITA,
which concerned construction of the
1930 Tariff Act.
As Chart Three (A) demonstrates, where binational panels issued
decisions reviewing United States agency final determinations, those
panels frequently agreed on whether a final determination warranted
affirmation or whether it needed to be remanded to the administering
U.S. agency for redetermination. Of the 19 such cases, a total of 35
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 15:525 (1995)
panel opinions were delivered under the FTA.4 s Of those 35 panel
opinions, all but four were unanimous. This would seem to provide
clear evidence that binational panels conducted their affairs in a rela-
tively harmonious manner when reviewing U.S. agency findings.49
In the four cases where dissenting opinions were delivered in
cases reviewing U.S. agency final determinations, the main source of
disagreement between the panel majority and the dissenting panel-
ist(s) concerned the applicable "standard of review." In those four
cases, dissenting panelists generally divided along national lines as to
what constituted the appropriate standard of review, i.e. American
panelists took positions supportive of the ITA or ITC, while Canadian
panelists affirmed the arguments advanced by the aggrieved Canadian
exporter(s). Thus, in New Steel Rails,50 where the panel majority up-
held an affirmative ITC injury finding, the dissenting Canadian panel-
ist argued that the standard of review applied by the majority was
overly deferential to the U.S. agency.51 In Live Swine,52 where the
panel majority remanded the ITA's antidumping calculations, the dis-
senting American panelist argued that the standard of review applied
by the majority was too strict and that the ITA was entitled to greater
judicial deference.53 In Softwood Lumber,54 the two dissenting United
States panelists argued vehemently that the panel majority, composed
of three Canadians, had egregiously applied an overly-stringent stan-
dard of review which contravened United States judicial practice.55
Similarly, in Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Products,56 a Canadian
panelist dissented from the majority's affirmation of an ITA finding.
The Canadian panelist contended that the ITA's construction and ap-
plication of U.S. antidumping law contradicted the express language
48 This is because of the fact that many cases resulted in the issuance of two, or, at times
three, panel opinions.
49 However, in three additional cases, panelists, while not officially dissenting, issued state-
ments of "additional views" in which they departed from the panel majority as to the applicable
standard of review.
50 See New Steel Rails, supra note 37.
51 New Steel Rails, supra note 37 at 40 (dissenting opinion of Richard Gottlics).
52 Live Swine From Canada, No. USA-91-1904-03, 1 N. Am. Free Trade Agreements: Disp.
Settlement (Oceana), Booklets B.13, B.13B (hereinafter "Live-Swine").
53 Id. Booklet B.13B (Oct. 30, 1992) at 69.
54 See Softwood Lumber, supra note 20, Booklet B.20B.
55 Softwood Lumber, supra note 20, Booklet B.20B at 69-110.
56 In the Matter of Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Canada,
Opinion and Order of the Panel, No. USA-93-1904-03, 2 N. Am. Free Trade Agreements: Disp.
Settlement (Oceana), Booklet B.31 (Oct. 31, 1994).
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of the statute, and would have remanded the matter to the ITA for
redetermination.57
Have binational panels been split along national lines when ex-amining Canadian agency determinations? Chart Three (B) on the fol-
lowing page lists how panels have examined Revenue Canada and
CITT final determinations.
As Chart 3(B) shows, binational panels have been largely in
agreement when affirming or remanding final Canadian agency deter-
minations. Of the eleven cases where panels examined CITI' or Rev-
enue Canada final determinations, seventeen panel decisions were
rendered. Of those seventeen opinions, ten were unanimous, while
seven resulted in the issuance of dissenting opinions.5
Did the dissenters diverge from the panel majority along national
lines when reviewing Canadian agency determinations? In five of the
seven cases where U.S. panelists delivered dissenting opinions, they
did. In Induction Motors5 9 the dissenting U.S. panelist argued that the
CITF's final injury determination should not be affirmed and that a
more challenging mode of review was required than that employed by
the majority. In Beer,6° one United States panelist dissented from the
majority's decision to affirm the Tribunal's injury finding, arguing that
an overly deferential standard of review had been applied. In Tufted
Carpets,61 a dissenting U.S. panelist asserted that the panel majority,
in its second opinion, had applied an overly deferential standard of
review when upholding an affirmative CITT injury determination.62
In Cold Rolled Steel Sheet,63 a U.S. panelist dissented from the major-
ity's approval of Revenue Canada's antidumping determination and
would have remanded the determination for recalculation of the
dumping margins.64 Finally, in Pipe Fittings,65 a U.S. panelist dis-
sented from the majority's affirmation of the CITT's redetermination
57 Id. at 81. In this case, the panel majority remanded a number of issues to the ITA for
redetermination. The majority, however, affirmed the ITA's construction of U.S. antidumping
law on one of the issues in dispute, whereas the dissenting Canadian panelist would have re-
manded this matter to the ITA for reconsideration. Note that in this case, one U.S. panelist
joined the dissent and would have also remanded this issue to the ITA for reconsideration.
58 In two of the seventeen opinions, panelists issued statements of "additional views" in
which they disagreed with the approach taken by the majority, but where they agreed with the
result.
59 Induction Motors, supra note 40, at 80.
60 Beer, supra note 41, Booklet B.14B at 4-5 (Feb. 8, 1993).
61 Tufted Carpets, supra note 42, Booklet B.26B, at 10-13 (Jan. 21, 1994).
62 This dissenting opinion will be discussed, infra, at page 565.
63 Cold Rolled Steel Sheet, supra note 28.
64 Cold Rolled Steel Sheet, supra note 28, at 15.
65 Pipe Fittings, supra note 45, at 16-22 (dissenting opinion of Leonard E. Santos).
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CHART THREE (B)


































































One American panelist dissented,
taking issue with the CITT's choice of
methodology.
One U.S. panelist wrote a concurring
opinion, where he argued that the
standard of review chosen by the
majority was legally incorrect and
overly rigorous.
One U.S. panelist dissented, stating
that he would have remanded to the
CITT with an order to overturn its
affirmative injury determination.
One Canadian and one American
panelist dissented, arguing that the
application of a more deferential
standard of review was required.
One U.S. panelist dissented, arguing
that the panel majority had applied an
overly deferential standard of review.
One U.S.and one Canadian dissented,
asserting that a stricter standard of
review was required.
One U.S. panelist dissented, arguing
that Revenue Canada had not
complied with panel remand
instructions.
One U.S. panelist dissented, arguing
that the majority should have been less
deferential to the C1T.
The 2 U.S. panelists issued statements
of "additional views" in which they
suggested that the CITI needed to
offer improved reasoning in its final
determinations.
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on remand. The dissenting panelist found that the CrIT's conclusion
were based on speculation and that the majority had been forced to
reconcile conflicting evidence in sustaining the Canadian agency's
decision.6
Of the seven cases where dissenting opinions were delivered, dis-
senting panelists twice took a position that crossed national lines. In
the first of three decisions rendered in Tufted Carpets,67 one American
panelist refused to endorse the majority's remand instructions and in-
stead would have employed a more deferential standard of review in
order to affirm the CITr's affirmative injury finding. Similarly, in
Hot-Rolled Steel Sheet,68 a U.S. panelist refused to accept the position
of the three-member majority, which had upheld a CITT negative in-
jury determination. In that case, the U.S. panelist argued that a less
deferential standard of review was applicable, and would have re-
manded to the cIlT with respect to the agency's "causation"
analysis.69
In sum, binational panels under the FTA's Chapter 19 generally
issued unanimous opinions when reviewing U.S. and Canadian agency
final determinations. In the eleven Chapter 19 cases where dissenting
panel opinions were delivered, dissenting panelists usually took issue
with the standard of review that had been applied by the majority. In
such instances, dissenting Canadian panelists sought to inform their
U.S. counterparts as to what standard of review was applicable under
Canadian administrative law, and debated U.S. jurisprudence with a
view to fashioning a more rigorous standard of review that could be
applied to U.S. agency final determinations. At the same time, where
U.S. panelists issued dissenting opinions, they frequently did so in or-
der to dispute the interpretation of U.S. law made by Canadian panel-
ists, and to formulate a less deferential standard of review that could
be applied to Canadian agency final determinations.
C. Tme Limits and the "Remand" Process.
The statistics are conclusive in showing that Canadian exporters
benefited greatly from Chapter 19 panel review, particularly in ap-
peals of ITA antidumping and countervailing duty calculations.
Besides reducing or eliminating duty levels, an equally pointed
concern in the FTA negotiations was to ensure that final panel deci-
66 Pipe Fittings, supra note 45, at 20.
67 Tufted Carpets, supra note 42, Booklet B26A at 49 (April 7 1993).
68 Hot Rolled Steel Sheet, supra note 46, at 57-65.
69 Hot Rolled Steel Sheet, supra note 46, at 57.
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sions would be made as quickly as possible. To address this concern,
Chapter 19 created a 315 day deadline from the date of request for a
panel until the delivery of a first panel decision.7° ETA Chapter 19
panels were reasonably successful in making an initial decision within
this time-frame. Of the thirty cases where panels issued decisions, this
deadline was met fourteen times. During the FTA, Chapter 19 panels
on average issued first decisions within 360 days from the day that a
request for panel review was made.
A more striking statistic with respect to time deadlines concerns
the duration of panel review. In the 30 completed FTA cases where
panels issued decisions, the average duration of panel review was 511
days.71 This is longer than was initially anticipated, and these delay
problems have become one of the more serious procedural deficien-
cies in the Chapter 19 process.72 Nevertheless, this is still a considera-
ble improvement over the situation which existed prior to the FTA,
where the CIT averaged 734 days to complete its review of a final
determination.73
This Chapter 19 "defect" is a direct product of the "remand" pro-
cess. Negotiators purposely limited the mandate of binational panels
so that panels could either affirm a final determination, or "remand"
that determination to the appropriate investigating agency.74 The
agency would then, in its "redetermination on remand," take action
"not inconsistent with the panel decision."'7 The system was struc-
tured in this manner so that panels would be expressly prohibited
from substituting their own conclusions for those of the determining
agencies.
Chart Four on the following page shows that Chapter 19 panels
used their "remand" powers extensively. Of the thirty FTA cases
where panel decisions were rendered, twenty were remanded to do-
70 FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(14).
71 The duration of panel review was calculated by using the date of the request for Chapter
19 panel review and the date that the final Chapter 19 panel decision or order was delivered. In
the three cases where a Chapter 19 panel decision was challenged before an Extraordinary Chal-
lenge Committee, the duration of panel review was calculated with reference to the date of the
ECC opinion.
72 The average duration of panel review in the eleven completed Chapter 19 cases that re-
viewed Canadian agency final determinations was 459 days, while the average duration of review
in the nineteen completed cases which examined United States agency determinations was 542
days.
73 In cases where CIT decisions were appealed to the CAFC, the duration of panel review
was 1,210 days. See GAO Study, supra note 15, at 57-8.
74 FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(8).
75 FTA, supra note 1, at 1904(8).
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mestic agencies for "reconsideration." Of those twenty remand or-
ders, fourteen were to United States agencies and six to Canadian
agencies.
CHART FOUR



































































The data supports a finding that panels challenged U.S. agency
determinations quite stringently and as a matter of course. Even after
the U.S. agencies submitted redeterminations on remand, panels were
often unwilling to affirm those recalculations.77
In sharp contrast, Chapter 19 panels ordered Canadian agencies
to "reconsider" their findings for a second time in a single case.78
Such asymmetry is consistent with our general conclusion: FTA Chap-
ter 19 panel review effectively forced the reversal of unsubstantiated
United States agency determinations, but failed to provide the same
76 Supra note 35. This case was stayed as of August 4, 1994. See supra note 36 and
accompanying text. The duration of panel review calculated in this case is the time period
between the request for panel review and the date on which the proceedings were stayed.
77 On eight separate occasions, panels remanded U.S. agency determinations for a second
time.
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type of relief for American exporters challenging Revenue Canada
and CE final determinations.
The remand procedure was a central cause behind the extended
delays that afflicted Chapter 19 decision-making during the FTA. This
was particularly evident in some of the more controversial Chapter 19
cases. In Pork79 (609 days), Pork-CVDs° (631 days), Softwood Lum-
bers' (797 days) and Lumber-Injury82 (741 days), panels evinced a
firm intention to reject agency conclusions that were not rationally
connected to supporting evidence. However, even in less controver-
sial cases such as Paving Equipment8 3 (867 days) and Tufted Carpets'
(694 days), the protracted duration of panel review suggests that
panels were somewhat circumscribed in their ability to expeditiously
dispose of applications.
Panel application of a notional rule of "finality" prevented the
time delay problem from becoming even more acute. In a number of
cases, including Softwood Lumber,8' Live Swine,8 6 and Pork,87 panels
prevented domestic agencies on remand from re-opening the admin-
istrative record or from adducing new evidence to support previously-
determined conclusions. These panels in effect used the remand pro-
cess to terminate review by "instructing" the agency to overturn "un-
sustainable" conclusions. In Softwood Lumber,88 for example, the
panel concluded, after having already remanded once to the ITA with
a request for more "substantial evidence:"
this is the second occasion on which Commerce has failed to provide a
rational explanation of how the evidence before it leads logically to the
conclusion that the provincial stumpage programs are specific under
U.S. law. Its examination of the evidence on this occasion, while not
according to law, has been detailed, and in the Majority's view there is
little to gain from putting the parties to the time and expense of another
remand... [w]e therefore remand this issue to Commerce for a determi-
79 Pork, supra note 30.
80 Pork-CVD, supra note 21.
81 See Softwood Lumber, supra note 20.
82 See Lumber-Injury, supra note 35.
83 Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from Canada Deci-
sion of the Panel, No. USA-90-1904-01, 1 N. Am. Free Trade Agreements: Disp. Settlements
(Oceana), Booklets B.11A (May 24, 1991), B.11B (May 15, 1992), B.11C. (Oct. 28, 1992) (here-
inafter "Paving Equipment").
84 Tufted Carpets, supra note 42.
85 See Softwood Lumber, supra, note 20.
86 Live Swine, supra note 52.
87 Pork supra note 30.
88 See Softwood Lumber, supra note 20, Booklet B.20B.
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nation that the provincial stumpage programs are not provided to a spe-
cific enterprise... 89
The power to invoke "finality" was not explicitly provided for in
Chapter 19.90 However, Chapter 19 of the FTA does state - and this
was relied upon by numerous panels - "(the panel) shall issue a final
decision within ninety days of the date on which such remand action is
submitted to it."91
As a result of this ambiguity in the FTA's provisions, the U.S.
government twice challenged a panel's ability to "invoke finality"
before Extraordinary Challenge Committees. U.S. parties alleged
that such a "draconian" application of finality had not been followed
by the Court of International Trade, and that since binational panels
were to serve as surrogates for domestic courts, the panels were in
effect "inventing" rules of procedure. 2
In both the Pork93 and Live Swine94 Extraordinary Challenges,
the Committees unanimously upheld a Chapter 19 panel's ability to
terminate panel proceedings. In the Pork95 Extraordinary Challenge,
the Committee concluded:
Taking into consideration the Panel's mandate to resolve matters expedi-
tiously, the Committee cannot find that the Panel clearly exceeded its
authority under these circumstances in remanding the ITC's determina-
tion for action not inconsistent with the Panel's first and second remand
decisions.
The Committee notes that there are no restrictions on the Panel's
power to remand with or without instructions to the competent investi-
gating authority.
96
89 See Softwood Lumber, supra note 20, Booklet B.20B at 31 (emphasis added).
90 Article 1904(8) of the FTA was vague as to limitations on the number of remands that a
panel could order. FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(8).
91 FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(8) (emphasis added).
92 This statement was actually made by a U.S. panelist who dissented in Live Swine, see supra
note 52, Booklet B.13B (Oct. 30 1992), at 12. However, his comments are illustrative of way in
which U.S. parties framed their allegations before the Pork Swine, and Softwood Lumber ECCs.
93 In the Matter of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada, Memorandum Opinion and
Order Regarding Binational Panel Remand Decision II No. ECC-91-1904-01 USA, 1 N. Am.
Free Trade Agreements: Disp. Settlement (Oceana), Booklet B.8C (June 14, 1991) (hereinafter
"Pork ECC").
94 In the Matter of Live Swine from Canada, Extraordinary Challenge Committee Proceed-
ing, Memorandum Opinion and Order Regarding Binational Panel Remand Decision and Or-
der, No. ECC-93-1904-01 USA, 1 N. Am. Free Trade Agreements: Disp. Settlement (Oceana),
Booklet B.13C (April 8, 1993) (hereinafter "Swine ECC").
95 Supra, note 93.
96 Supra note 93 at 24 (emphasis added).
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The approach adopted by the Pork97 ECC was reaffirmed by the
Live Swine98 Extraordinary Challenge Committee. By upholding the
validity of this "rule of finality," the Live Swine Committee strength-
ened a panel's ability to terminate proceedings after the panel issued a
second remand order.
From the perspective of Canadian exporters, the rule of "finality"
has been a positive aspect of the Chapter 19 process and has partially
offset the problems associated with a panel's limited remedial powers.
American agencies have, unsurprisingly, been much less enthusiastic
about this development.
Notwithstanding some pointed criticism of the Chapter 19 deci-
sion-making process by the United States government before Ex-
traordinary Challenge Committees, it appears that the ability of a
Chapter 19 panel to terminate the adjudication after a second remand
decision had a disciplining effect, particularly on the two U.S. adminis-
tering agencies. The observations of one commentator during a
midterm review of the Chapter 19 experience remain true at the end
of the FTA Chapter 19 experiment:
I have no doubt that the existence of the binational review procedure
has made the international trade agencies of the United States more at-
tentive to developing a record and sticking to it, to consistency in their
own regulations and precedents, and to the importance of explaining
their actions with more care when they have departed from prior
practice.9 9
We will now conclude our examination of the aggregate Chapter
19 statistics by considering another chief contributor to the time delay
problem: the suspension of panels due to the withdrawal of panelists.
D. The Withdrawal of Panelists.
In Canada, the replacement of traditional judicial review with
binational panel review was a much celebrated achievement. 100 Ex-
porters anticipated that appealing United States agency determina-
tions before adjudicative bodies consisting of lawyers and academics
familiar with the intricacies of trade remedy law would afford them
with an opportunity to challenge AD/CVD and injury findings with
97 Supra note 93.
98 Supra note 94.
99 ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, "REFLECTIONS ON DispuTE SEttLEMENT UNDER THE FTA:
WHERE Do WE Go FROM H.an?" (Address to Centre for Trade Policy and Law, University of
Ottawa, May 18 1993) (unpublished). See also, Robichaud and Steger, supra note 13, at 20.
100 See A. Andrew Anderson and Alan Rugman,The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: A
Legal and Economic Analysis of the Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 6 J. INT'L ARB. 4,65 (1989).
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement 1989-95
15:525 (1995)
greater efficacy. From the outset, however, it was recognized that the
success of the Chapter 19 experiment would be fundamentally tied to
an ability to attract and retain qualified individuals to serve as
panelists.
To date, the two countries have not had difficulty in attracting
individuals conversant in the complexities of unfair trade law to serve
as panelists. However, a problem has arisen with respect to retaining
panelists for the duration of the review process. In total, eleven pan-
elists have withdrawn from Chapter 19 cases after the initiation of
panel proceedings. Of those panelists, seven have removed themselves
from review of Canadian agency determinations, while four have "re-
cused" themselves from proceedings examining United States agency
determinations.' 0 '
A number of lawyers have removed themselves from binational
panels because of the occurrence of non-related developments that
could put into question their impartiality, such as perceived conflicts
of interest. The specter of more panelists withdrawing from panels -
or refusing to participate on them altogether - may have been height-
ened by recent pronouncements of the Softwood Lumber Extraordi-
nary Challenge Committee.'0
In the Softwood Lumber Extraordinary Challenge, the U.S.T.R.
alleged that two Canadian panelists had breached the FTA's "Code of
Conduct" by failing to disclose adequately information concerning
their legal practices. The U.S.T.R. contended that this non-disclosure
threatened the integrity of the binational panel process because: (i) a
company in which one of the Canadian panelists held an interest had
been retained by the Canadian Department of Transport on a non-
related matter during the course of his tenure as a panelist, thus alleg-
edly affiliating him with the Canadian government; and (ii) both of the
panelists allegedly had failed to disclose in a timely manner the rela-
tionships that their law firms had with lumber companies that were
interested in the outcome of the litigation.
The majority of justices on the Extraordinary Challenge Commit-
tee, both Canadian, dismissed the allegations. Justice Hart found that
the two panelists had made "reasonable" efforts to maintain their im-
partiality, and concluded that only a "willful" failure to disclose infor-
101 The 11 withdrawals actually affected 13 cases. This is because two of the panelists in ques-
tion were appointed to serve on two separate panels concurrently.
102 In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, Memorandum Opin-
ion and Order, No. ECC-94-1904-01 USA, 2 N. Am. Free Trade Agreements: Disp. Settlement
(Oceana) (Aug. 3, 1994) (hereinafter "Lumber ECC").
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mation would be sufficient to threaten the integrity of the binational
panel review process. 10 3 Justice Morgan was somewhat more critical
of the panelists, calling one of them "remiss" in failing to update dis-
closure statements during the course of the Softwood Lumber panel
review. Nevertheless, he also found that the non-disclosure was not of
sufficient magnitude so as to constitute a "material breach" within the
meaning of the Chapter 19 Code of Conduct.'
0 4
By contrast, the sole American sitting on the Committee, Judge
Wilkey, found that the violations of the Code of Conduct clearly
threatened the integrity of the panel process. Where the Canadian
judges implied that annulling the panel decision on account of the al-
legations would have had the effect of deterring qualified individuals
from serving as panelists, the U.S. judge appeared more concerned
with disciplining the alleged "misconduct." After chronicling the al-
leged violations committed by the Canadian panelists, Judge Wilkey
concluded that vacating the panel's decision was imperative:
I cannot think of anything that could more materially affect a Panel's
decision than to have two of the necessary votes cast by members who
have failed to disclose matters which would affect their impartiality.
Likewise, to tolerate such failure to disclose would constitute the most
obvious and dangerous threat to the integrity of the Binational Panel
review process, because the selection of those members rests entirely on
the voluntary, complete and continuing disclosure of any possible affilia-
tions casting doubt on the members' impartiality. If we want to sabotage
the entire Panel Review process, we can do it by tolerating these clear
and unmistakable violations and declining to vacate the Panel's opinion
in this case.105
The Extraordinary Challenge Committee in Softwood Lumber
confirmed how important it is for panelists to comply with disclosure
obligations and to avoid the appearance of impropriety or bias. The
revised Code of Conduct"° implemented under NAFTA builds on the
Softwood Lumber experience by creating even more stringent disclo-
sure requirements for Chapter 19 panelists.
10 7
While this episode emphasized how the success of the Chapter 19
experiment is inexorably tied to full and complete disclosure by panel-
103 Id. at 32.
104 Id. at 50-52.
105 Id. at 106.
106 The NAFTA Code of Conduct was published in the United States at: North American
Free Trade Code of Conduct for Proceedings Under Chapters 19 and 20, 59 Fed Reg. 8720
(1994).
107 For an analysis of the NAFTA Code of Conduct, see James R. Holbein and Alicia D.
Greenridge, NAFTA Code of Conduct Provides International Guidelines for Ethical Behavior, 1
NAFIA LAW & Bus. REvmw OF THE AMERICAS 1 (forthcoming).
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement 1989-95
15:525 (1995)
ists, there is a danger that creating too high a threshold as to what
constitutes a material "conflict of interest" may impair the effective-
ness of the Chapter 19 system under NAFTA. One must remember
that the international trade bar, from which panelists are chosen, is
concentrated in a small number of law firms. This is particularly the
case in Canada where firms engaging in international trade are often
retained by federal, provincial, and municipal governments on non-
trade related matters. If panelists who are lawyers are deemed to be
affiliated with their national government(s) merely by reason of the
fact that their law firms have been retained by such governments on
non-related matters, and if such affiliation is taken automatically to
constitute a "conflict of interest," a high proportion of qualified candi-
dates will be unable, and, eventually, unwilling, to serve as Chapter 19
panelists in the future. With a depletion of lawyers willing to partici-
pate, the hybrid Chapter 19 dispute resolution mechanism could re-
vert toward the traditional system of more deferential judicial review.
If such a scenario materializes, the FTA's express objective of provid-
ing more careful scrutiny of final agency determinations could be
frustrated.0 8
In summary, the statistics provided in Part I of this Study appears
to support the following conclusions: First, Canadian exporters dis-
proportionately benefited from the implementation of binational
panel review. Since 1989, Canadians were quite successful in appeal-
ing antidumping and countervailing duty determinations before bina-
tional tribunals. In contrast, binational panel review of Canadian
agency findings did not formally assist aggrieved American exporters.
To date, they have not succeeded on a single antidumping or injury
petition.
Second, panel opinions under Chapter 19 were generally unani-
mously delivered. Where dissenting decisions were given, the main
source of divergence between majority and dissent concerned the ap-
plicable "standard of review."
Third, the "remand" problem, resulting from a limited panel
mandate, caused delays in the panel review process. However, panel
application of a notional rule of "finality" somewhat resolved this
problem. The ability to effectively terminate proceedings appeared to
have a disciplining effect on domestic agencies, as those bodies began
108 This dim prognosis has not yet been borne out under NAFTA. To date, the more stringent
NAFTA Code of Conduct does not appear to have discouraged qualified lawyers from serving
on Chapter 19 panels. Interview with James R. Holbein, U.S. Secretary of the NAFTA Secreta-
riat, in Washington D.C. (Jan. 15, 1995), and follow-up discussions.
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to produce more persuasive final determinations and redetermina-
tions on remand.
Finally, there has been an increase in recent years in the number
of panels that have been suspended due to the withdrawal of panelists.
Such a development may be exacerbated in the coming years as a
stricter view of the disclosure obligations might dissuade panelists
from participating in the process.
II. EXPLAINING T=E DISPARITY OF RESULTS
The aggregate statistics of binational panel review during the
FTA years showed that Canadian exporters, when compared to their
American counterparts, enjoyed a disproportionate amount of success
in their appeal of final agency determinations. There are a number of
reasons that might explain why this disparity of results arose. First, it
is possible that Canadian agencies had superior legal representation
before binational panels. Most Chapter 19 analysts would agree, how-
ever, that the quality of legal representation during Chapter 19 litiga-
tion has not significantly diverged across national lines for the
administering agencies.
Second, the asymmetry in results could be explained if one be-
lieved that Canadian agency final determinations were simply more
clearly articulated and well reasoned than those produced by U.S.
agencies. Such a finding is supported by the fact that binational
panels only remanded six Canadian agency final determinations for
redetermination, while fourteen such U.S. agency final determinations
were returned for "reconsideration."
While the quality of final determinations does not seem to have
differed much across national lines, it is possible that ITA final deter-
minations may be grounded more on supposition than are final deter-
minations made by Revenue Canada. For example, ITA antidumping
and countervailing duty calculations are often made by using "Best
Information Available" ("BIA") in the absence of more solid eviden-
tiary support.10 9
109 BIA is a rule which the U.S. Congress created to assist the ITA render AD and CVD
determinations in cases where a respondent refuses or is unable to produce information, or
where a respondent significantly impedes an antidumping investigation. In situations where the
ITA does not receive a "complete, accurate and timely response to the Secretary's request for
factual information," the ITA may "construct" the relevant data by relying on the "best informa-
tion available." 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(e)(c)).
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Both the ITA and Revenue Canada are entitled under the
GATJ 110 to use BIA, but the ITA has employed such methodology
more often than Revenue Canada. If ITA final determinations are
disproportionately based on BIA, and if Revenue Canada's determi-
nations are more substantiated with actual evidence, binational panels
would have greater scope to attack ITA conclusions on grounds that
such findings lack evidentiary support.
111
A third possible explanation for the disparity in results can be
traced to differences between Canadian and American trade remedy
regimes. While Canadian and American trade laws are similarly
grounded in GATT treaty obligations, both countries have enjoyed
wide latitude when interpreting their responsibilities under the GAT
Subsidies and Antidumping Codes. As a result, Canada and the
United States have codified in domestic statutes somewhat different
interpretations and approaches to the concepts of "countervailable
subsidy," "antidumping," and "material injury." If the Special Import
Measures Act 1 2 confers on Canadian administering agencies a greater
level of deference and discretion than that accorded to the ITA and
ITC by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,113 it should be relatively
more difficult to reverse a Canadian agency determination on grounds
that the agency misinterpreted or exceeded its statutory mandate." 4
While a detailed comparison of the two legal regimes is beyond
the scope of this Study, there are some substantive differences be-
tween U.S. and Canadian trade remedy regimes. Rather than sup-
porting the assertion that the Canadian regime is structured in such a
way so as to facilitate a greater number of affirmative determinations
of dumping, unfair subsidization and material injury, there are two
differences which suggest that the United States regime is somewhat
more "protectionist" in its approach to trade remedy laws. First,
United States law with respect to what constitutes a "countervailable
subsidy" was broader in scope than the approach adopted in Canada
110 Both the Canadian and American BIA rules are derived from GATr art. VI(8), which
provides: "In cases in which any interested person refuses access to or otherwise does not pro-
vide necessary information within a period or significantly impedes the investigation, prelimi-
nary and final findings, affirmative or negative, may be made on the basis of the facts available."
111 This was the case throughout the FTA Chapter 19 experience. Panels repeatedly rejected
and remanded ITA final determinations that were disproportionately reliant on BIA. See e.g.,
Paving Equipment, supra note 83.
112 Special Measures Import Act, R.S.C. 1985 c.S-15 (hereinafter "SIMA").
113 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1979).
114 For a thorough comparison of Canadian and American trade remedy regimes, see James
R. Holbein, et. al., Comparative Analysis of Specific Elements in United States and Canadian
Unfair Trade Law, 26 INr'L LAw 873 (1992).
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during the FTA years." 5 This is not surprising given Canada's more
benign approach to the use of governmental assistance to the private
sector. Second, it has been effectively argued that the threshold that
must be met in order to find "material injury" is lower in the United
States than in Canada, and thus can be more easily met.1 6 On the
whole, then, it is difficult to conclude that the relative success of Cana-
dian agencies in defending their final determinations before binational
panels can be attributed to more "protectionist" Canadian trade rem-
edy laws.
While the aforementioned factors may have played some role in
causing the disparity of Chapter 19 results under the FTA, there are
two other causes that seem more responsible for producing the asym-
metric outcomes. First, there existed a disparity in the standards of
judicial review that were applied to final Canadian and American
agency determinations during the FTA. 1 7 Although the standard of
review applicable to Revenue Canada findings appears similar to the
standard of review relevant to United States agency final determina-
tions, the standard applicable to final CITT determinations is more
deferential than the general United States standard."8 This is because
the existence of a "privative" clause 19 effectively "insulated" CITr
determinations from the same type of exacting and unyielding review
that has characterized examination of United States agency determi-
nations and Revenue Canada findings. This divergence in standards
115 Under the Uruguay Round Subsidies Code, subsidies are classified as actionable, non-
actionable and prohibited. Part V of the Subsidies Code sets out detailed rules governing coun-
tervailing duties. CVDs may only be imposed on actionable and prohibited subsides. See gener-
ally MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK AND ROBERT HowsE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE ch. 6 (1995).
116 See Holbein, supra note 114, at 888.
117 Article 1904(3) requires that panels, when reviewing the administrative record, "apply the
standard of review described in Article 1911 and the general legal principles that a court of the
importing country would apply." Such general legal principles include "standing, due process,
rules of statutory construction, mootness, and exhaustion of legal remedies." See FTA, supra
note 1, art. 1911.
118 The standard of review applicable to U.S. agency determinations is contained in 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(b)(1)(B). The standard applicable to the CITT and to Revenue Canada during the FTA
was contained in § 28(1) of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.F-7 (hereinafter "FCA").
119 In Canadian administrative law practice, such clauses refer to explicit language found in
an enabling statute which seeks to "protect" the substance of agency's determination from judi-
cial review. The privative clause that affected CITT final determinations during the FTA was
found in the SIMA, supra note 112, § 76(1):
76. Orders and findings of Tribunal final. - (1) Subject to this section, subsection 61(3),
paragraph 91(1)(g), section 96(1) and Part II, every order of the Tribunal under this Act is
final and conclusive (emphasis added).
Effective as of January 1, 1994, the "privative clause" applicable to the CITT was repealed.
See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, S.C. 1993, c.44, § 217(1).
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of review made reversal of CIT determinations much less likely than
reversal of United States agency final determinations during the FTA.
The other factor responsible for the asymmetry of outcomes con-
cerns the manner in which binational panels formulated and applied
the somewhat divergent standards of review. When examining United
States agency final determinations, Chapter 19 panels meticulously
surveyed and debated conflicting propositions that exist in United
States administrative law jurisprudence concerning the applicable
standard of review. These panels routinely used conflicting state-
ments from leading U.S. cases to construct a relatively stringent stan-
dard of review, and then applied that standard in their review of the
final determination in dispute. The application of this exacting and
unyielding approach to judicial review has resulted in the effective re-
versal of several United States agency findings.
In sharp contrast to panels examining United States agency deter-
minations, panelists reviewing CITr agency findings rarely explored
and debated the value and weight of conflicting propositions in Cana-
dian administrative law concerning the appropriate standard of re-
view. The dedication that panelists displayed in constructing a
relatively strict standard of review when ITA and ITC determinations
were in dispute was notably absent from binational panel review of
CITr determinations.
Where panels did examine the standard of review applicable to
the CITr, panelists were unsure as to precisely how much deference
was required to be granted to the CT under Canadian law. In the
two cases where a relatively strict standard of review was employed,
panels remanded final C=T determinations on grounds that there
lacked a rational nexus between conclusions and supporting evi-
dence.120 On the whole, however, binational panels generally fol-
lowed the precedent set by Canadian courts and accorded broad
deference to CT final determinations.21
Binational panel review of Revenue Canada final determinations
was more exacting than review of CITr conclusions, attributable, in
large part, to the fact that Revenue Canada findings are not "insu-
lated" by a privative clause. Panels formulated and employed the
standard of review applicable to Revenue Canada quite effectively
and challenged complex Revenue Canada determinations rigorously.
As will be explained below, the fact that American exporters have not
120 See Beer, supra note 41 and Tufted Carpets, supra note 42.
121 See, for example, Pipe Fittings, supra note 45 and Cold Rolled Steel Sheet, supra note 43.
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realized large reductions in duty levels is more attributable to other
factors than to excessive panel deference.
The balance of this Part of the Study is devoted to showing that
these two factors have been the most significant causes behind the
asymmetry of outcomes. We will begin by examining panels decisions
that reviewed CITT and Revenue Canada final determinations, and
will then proceed by examining three cases which were brought
against United States agencies. Before each discussion, some back-
ground on the applicable standard of review is provided.
A. Cases Reviewing Canadian Agency Determinations
1. The "CITY" Standard of Review
In Canada, the Federal Court Act sec. 28(1)122 sets out the stan-
dard of review which is to be applied by reviewing bodies to Revenue
Canada and CITT final determinations. A reviewing court can set
aside an agency determination if the appropriate investigating
authority:
(a) failed to observe a principle of natural justice or otherwise acted
beyond or refused to exercise its jurisdiction;
(b) erred in law in making its decision or order, whether or not the or-
der appears on the face of the record; or
(c) based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a
perverse or capricious manner or without regard to the material before
it.
When ascertaining how much deference needs to be accorded to
the decisions of expert government tribunals, Canadian courts first ex-
amine the legislative intention behind the decision to confer jurisdic-
tion on the administrative tribunal. In situations where the
administrative tribunal is not protected by a "privative" clause, and
where petitioners have been granted a statutory right of appeal, courts
will examine the tribunal's decision and underlying reasoning strictly.
On the other hand, in cases where petitioners are not granted a statu-
tory right of appeal, and where the administering agency is protected
by a privative clause, judicial deference is at its highest.
12 3
During the FTA years, the standard of review that Canadian
courts would apply to final CIT- determinations was different from
that which would be applied to final Revenue Canada findings be-
122 Federal Court Act R.S.C. 1985, ch. F-7 § 28(1)(1970-71-72)(Can.) (hereinafter "ECA").
123 Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers) 2 S.C.R. 557 at 590 (1994) (herein-
after "Pezim").
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cause of the existence of a "privative" clause. 24 The Supreme Court
of Canada has outlined the standard of review to be applied to admin-
istrative tribunal decisions in the presence of a such a clause:
[w]here the relevant legislative provision is a true privative clause, judi-
cial review is limited to errors of jurisdiction resulting from an error in
interpreting a legislative provision limiting the tribunal's powers or a pa-
tently unreasonable error on a question of law otherwise within the tribu-
nal's jurisdiction.12
Thus, when reviewing a CITT final determination, judicial review
of alleged errors may proceed only if it is demonstrated that the Tribu-
nal (i) exceeded its jurisdiction, or (ii) committed a "patently unrea-
sonable" error of law or fact.
When considering an administering agency's "jurisdiction" under
FCA § 28(1)(a), Canadian courts first turn to an examination of the
agency's empowering statute. Generally, the agency will have ex-
ceeded its jurisdiction, and thus subjected itself to judicial review, if it
has erred, no matter how reasonably, in its interpretation of the legis-
lative provision which defines and limits its jurisdiction. 26 The more
specialized the administering agency - ascertainable only by examiniig
the purpose and complexity of the empowering legislation - the more
diffcult it will be to characterize an error as "jurisdictional."
If the expert tribunal is found to have exceeded its jurisdiction, its
determination will be reviewed by way of the "correctness" test. If a
reviewing body concludes that the agency has inquired into matters
which were not authorized by statute, the agency's determination will
be deemed "incorrect" and the reviewing body will remand the deci-
sion for "redetermination." This "correctness" test, when employed,
is very demanding on the agency under review.
It is difficult for Canadian courts to find that expert tribunals such
as the CITT have exceeded their jurisdiction. The SIMA, 127 which the
CITT is commissioned to administer, is highly specialized legislation
which, in turn, makes it difficult to successfully frame alleged CITT
misconduct as "jurisdictional." Therefore, even though Canadian ad-
ministrative law does provide for exacting judicial review, the applica-
tion of the stringent "correctness" test to a CIT determination will
rarely occur.
124 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
125 United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 579 v. Bradco Construc-
tion Ltd., 2 S.C.R. 316 (1992) (Can.) (emphasis added).
126 U.E.S., Local 298 v. Bibeault, 2 S.C.R. 1048, 1088 (1988) (Can.).
127 See supra note 112.
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If a reviewing body concludes that the CI=T has maintained "ju-
risdiction," it may still review alleged mistakes if it finds that the
agency made a "patently unreasonable" error of law or finding of fact
under FCA § 28(1)(b) and (c).
An important recent discussion of the Supreme Court of Canada
which considered the "patently unreasonable" test in the presence of
a privative clause is found in National Corn Growers Association., Lo-
cal 740 v. Canada (Import Tribunal).12 In this case, the Court re-
viewed a final material injury determination made by the Canadian
Import Tribunal. 129 Justice Wilson, speaking for the minority, ex-
amined the bounds of the "patently unreasonable" test. She con-
cluded that in the presence of a privative clause the courts should
neither undertake a meticulous analysis of a tribunal's reasoning nor
interfere with an administrative tribunal's conclusions so long as the
tribunal has "properly interpreted its constitutive statute in a patently
reasonable fashion.'
130
Justice Gonthier, for the majority, held that a court would inter-
fere with the conclusions of a specialized tribunal only where it was
found that the tribunal's conclusions could not be sustained on "any
reasonable interpretation of the facts or law or where the agency ex-
ceeded its jurisdiction.'
131
While the Gonthier approach in Corn Growers may facilitate a
more rigorous review of an expert tribunal's reasoning than the Wil-
son approach in that case, the decision did not overturn the ingrained
judicial deference that exists in Canada to specialized agencies pro-
tected by privative clauses. The "patently unreasonable" test, which
must be applied in the presence of a privative clause to errors of fact
or law, still gives broad discretion to the findings of an administering
agency. Subsequent cases have concluded that so long as there exists
"any evidence" capable of supporting a tribunal's decision, Canadian
courts will give "curial deference" to such tribunals and will not find
an expert tribunal's decision "patently unreasonable."' 3 This judicial
approach is clearly more deferential than the "correctness" test out-
lined above, and, as will be explored below, is more accomodative of
the expert body under review than are U.S. courts.
128 National Corn Growers Ass'n v. Canada (Import Tribunal), 2 S.C.R. 1324 (1990) (herein-
after "Corn Growers").
129 This administrative body became the CGIT in 1990.
130 Supra note 128, at 1348.
131 Supra note 128, at 1353-1383.
132 Bell Canada v. Canada (C.R.T.C.), 1 S.C.R. 1722, 1746 (1989) (Can.).
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2. CITT Cases
The quality of FTA Chapter 19 panel decisions reviewing the
seven CITT injury determinations was high, although panelists were
frequently divided as to how much deference was required under the
"patently unreasonable" test. At times, panels strongly challenged
CIT? findings and remanded on issues where there was not a clear
connection between conclusions and supporting evidence. In those in-
stances, panels formulated and applied a relatively rigorous standard
of review. In most cases, however, panels dealt with complex matters
in a traditionally deferential manner, upholding complicated and, at
times, contradictory CITI findings by concluding that those determi-
nations were not "patently unreasonable."
As was previously outlined, the existence of a "privative" clause
is the primary reason that disputable CIT determinations have been
upheld by panels. An examination of the Beer 33 case will illustrate (i)
that panels attempted under the FTA to apply the less deferential
"correctness" test to their review of CIT determinations in an effort
to challenge unfounded CI"T conclusions with greater austerity, but
that (ii) such panels had difficulty avoiding the reality that Canadian
administrative law dictates that alleged errors of law must be dealt
with by way of the highly deferential "patently unreasonable" test.
134
Also evident in the seven cases where Chapter 19 panels re-
viewed CT determinations is the fact that panels rarely explored the
bounds of Canadian administrative jurisprudence in an effort to deter-
mine precisely how much discretion had to be given to the CITT's
findings under the "patently unreasonable" test.135 Yet, even in the
few cases where panelists did seek to fashion and employ a strict ver-
sion of that test, they ultimately upheld the CIT's material injury
determinations. This uncertainty concerning how much deference
must be accorded under Canadian law to alleged CT errors of law
will be explored with reference to Tufted Carpets.
136
133 Beer, supra note 41.
134 Where the administrative tribunal in Canada is protected by a privative clause, see the
leading case of Canadian Union of Pub. Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp.,
[1979] 2 S.C.R. 227 which held that where an expert tribunal is acting within its jurisdiction, only
"patently unreasonable" errors of law are reviewable.
135 Again, this stands in contrast to Chapter 19 review of U.S. agency determinations where
panelists routinely debated U.S. standard of review jurisprudence. See eg., Softwood Lumber,
supra note 20, Booklet B.20B where the majority and dissent discussed at length how recently
decided CIT cases affected the U.S. standard of review.
136 Tufted Carpets, supra note 42.
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Certain Beer Originating in the United States
The main issue in Beer concerned the CIT's finding that a con-
centration of dumped United States imports had caused material in-
jury to the beer industry in the Province of British Columbia. In its
final determination, the CIT had found that the dumped U.S. im-
ports had led to "price suppression" which in turn had caused material
injury by contributing to the poorer financial performance of British
Columbian beer producers. The Tribunal, however, appeared to have
failed to demonstrate that the dumped imports in and of themselves
were a cause of the material injury. Given that American imports
constituted a negligible percentage of the amount of beer consumed in
British Columbia, and that domestic producers had lost profits as a
result of other changes occurring within the industry, it was tenuous at
best to conclude that the dumped imports were causing material
injury.' 3
7
American petitioners alleged that the SIMA138 required the Tri-
bunal to inquire solely into the causal link which may have existed
between the dumped imports and material injury. They argued that
the statute did not permit the Tribunal to inquire as to the existence of
a causal link between "extraneous factors" and material injury. Since
the Tribunal could not find the manifestation of material injury with-
out combining the effects of dumping and non-dumping extraneous
factors, the U.S. petitioners contended that the CIT had exceeded its
jurisdiction under FCA § 28(1)(a). They asserted that as a result of
this violation, the binational panel was required to employ the "cor-
rectness" test during its review.
In the first of two opinions, the panel rejected the Canadian in-
dustry's request to frame the U.S. exporters' allegations as "errors of
law," and thereby precluded application of the deferential "patently
unreasonable" standard of review.139 Instead, the panel attacked the
Tribunal's findings by applying the more stringent "correctness" test
on grounds that the agency had failed to conduct the type of inquiry
required by the SIMA.140 In a well-reasoned opinion, the panel con-
cluded that the SIMA had not authorized the Tribunal to make an
inquiry as to the existence of a causal link between extraneous factors
137 The CITr had found that changes in consumer preferences had led Molson and Labatt to
change their packaging configuration from bottles to cans. The Tribunal concluded that the cost
implications that resulted from this move were attributable to the American imports, all of which
were packaged in cans.
138 See supra note 112, § 42(1)(a).
139 Beer, supra note 41, Booklet B.14, (Aug. 26, 1992) at 21.
140 Beer, supra note 41, Booklet B.14 (Aug. 26, 1992) at 30.
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(i.e., non-dumping factors) and material injury. The panel remanded
this issue for redetermination becuase it concluded that the Tribunal
had transgressed the "correctness" standard. 4 '
In a concurring opinion the chairman of the panel, an American,
agreed that the agency had considered extraneous matters when c6n-
ducting its causation analysis, and remanded accordingly. 42 He dis-
agreed with the standard of review that the majority had applied.
Instead of the "jurisdiction" approach employed by the majority and
its concomitant, the more unyielding "correctness" test, the chairman
concluded that an "error of law" had been committed, and that the
"patently unreasonable" standard of review was therefore applica-
ble.' 43 He warned the majority that when a reviewing body is decid-
ing whether an issue is to be classified as an "error of law" or as a
"breach of jurisdiction," Canadian law requires that the administering
agency be given the "benefit of the doubt."'144 The chairman re-
manded the determination to the CIT on grounds that the Tribunal's
causation analysis was "patently unreasonable."' 14 5
In its redetermination on remand the CIT substantiated its orig-
inal determination, but its re-affirmation of material injury still ap-
peared far from compelling.'" Nevertheless, the panel majority, in a
cursory four-page judgment, upheld the CT's redetermination by
finding that it was not "patently unreasonable."'14 7 With respect to its
treatment of the standard of review issue, the panel held:
The scope of this Panel's inquiry in a review of the Determination on
Remand is much narrower than was the scope of its review of the Tribu-
nal's original Determination. The panel's inquiry in reviewing the De-
termination on Remand is thus limited to deciding whether the Tribunal
addressed the question that the Panel directed to it, followed the panel's
instructions, and is so doing reached a result that is not patently unrea-
141 Beer, supra note 41, Booklet B.14 (Aug. 26, 1992) at 30.
142 Beer, supra note 41, Booklet B.14 at 38 (Concurring Opinion of Chairman Greenberg).
143 Beer, supra note 41, Booklet B.14 at 31 (Concurring Opinion of Chairman Greenberg).
144 Beer, supra note 41, Booklet B.14 at 34 (Concurring Opinion of Chairman Greenberg).
145 Beer, supra note 41, Booklet B.14 at 37 (Concurring Opinion of Chairman Greenberg).
146 In reaffirming its original finding that the U.S. imports had caused material injury to the
Canadian industry, the CITr again took into account extraneous factors. The Tribunal's redeter-
mination was based on an examination not only of the effects of the dumped U.S. imports, but
also of other beer imports which had entered the B.C. market two years prior to Revenue Can-
ada's affirmative dumping finding. As the dissenting chairman noted in the second Beer panel
opinion, taking into account such extraneous factors contravened the GATT Antidumping Code.
See Beer, supra note 41, Booklet B14.B at 3-5 (Feb. 8, 1993) (Dissenting Opinion of Chairman
Greenberg).
147 See Beer, supra note 41, Booklet B14.B (Feb. 8, 1993) at 2.
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sonable and is supported by at least some evidence in the Tribunal's in-vestigative record. 4
The most noteworthy aspect of Beer is how the panel applied a
more lenient standard of review in its second opinion from the rela-
tively rigorous standard employed in its first. In the first decision,
when the panel employed the unyielding "correctness test," it chal-
lenged the agency's conclusions stringently, requiring the Tribunal to
demonstrate that a rational nexus existed between price suppression
and material injury. By contrast, once the more deferential "patently
unreasonable" test was employed in the second opinion, the panel af-
firmed the redetermination simply on grounds that the Tribunal had
successfully provided some evidentiary support for its conclusions.
Beer illustrates how the presence of a privative clause has helped
"insulate" the CITT from rigorous binational panel review. At the
outset of the case, the panel knew that because of the presence of the
privative clause, it would be obliged to examine alleged "errors of
law" by way of the deferential "patently unreasonable" test. In an
effort to avoid this deferential approach to judicial review, the panel
majority in its first opinion carefully tried to frame the alleged error as
one of "jurisdiction," to which the more stringent "correctness" test
could be applied. But the panel's rejection of this approach in its sec-
ond opinion - presumably on account of the dissenting chairman's
warnings - demonstrated how difficult it is under Canadian adminis-
trative law to categorize alleged CI=T errors as jurisdictional. In
short, this case demonstrates how difficult it is to avoid employing the
deferential "patently unreasonable" test when examining alleged
CITT misconduct.14 9
Given the fact that the panel felt obliged to employ the deferen-
tial "patently unreasonable" test, its second opinion is unsatisfactory
for two reasons. First, while the panel appears to have rejected the
148 See Beer, supra note 41, Booklet B14.B (Feb. 8, 1993) at 1-2.
149 The Beer panel's preference for the "patently unreasonable" standard over that of "cor-
rectness" set a precedent. In the five subsequent Chapter 19 cases that reviewed CIT!" final
determinations, not once was an alleged Tribunal error classified as a breach of jurisdiction.
Instead, panels uniformly characterized and examined alleged CIT mistakes as "errors of law"
or "errors of fact". As a consequence, the more deferential "patently unreasonable" test was
applied by panelists as a matter of course. The clearest example of this development was mani-
fest in Hot-Rolled Steel Sheet, supra note 46. In that case the panel was faced with the issue of
whether to characterize an alleged CIT'I error in interpretation of the SIMA "material injury"
test (§ 42(1)(a)) as a breach of jurisdiction or as an error of law. The panel refused to consider
the CITT's approach to causation as a matter of jurisdiction, and instead concluded that matters
of statutory interpretation raised alleged errors of law. By so doing, the panel reaffirmed the
notion that an extremely high threshold must be met before alleged CIT! errors would be re-
viewed by way of the less deferential jurisdiction/correctness approach. See id. at 14-15.
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"correctness" test in favor of the "patently unreasonable" approach, it
offered in its second opinion no explanation as to why it had changed
the applicable standard of review. This stands in sharp contrast to
Chapter 19 panel decisions which reviewed United States agency final
determinations. In almost all of those cases, panels - in second and
third opinions - went to great lengths explaining the applicable stan-
dard of review.
A second problem with the second Beer decision has to do with
its quality and length. The panel's opinion was notably short and not
especially well-reasoned. Again, this stands in sharp contrast to panel
review of United States agency redeterminations on remand. Where
panels in the latter situation issued second and third decisions, those
opinions continue to be of high quality when compared to initial
decisions.150
Given that panels were effectively unable to employ the more ex-
acting "jurisdiction"/"correctness" approach to alleged CITr errors,
the logical question to ask next is: how effective were the panels in
formulating and applying the "patently unreasonable" test? Tufted
Carpets15's illustrates that panels were deferential when applying this
approach.
Tufted Carpets from the United States
In this case, U.S. exporters appealed a CTT determination which
had found that dumped imports of tufted carpeting had caused, were
causing, and were likely to continue to cause material injury to the
production of like goods in Canada. 52 The Tribunal had concluded
that dumping had caused a significant increase in United States im-
ports, a substantial loss of market share by Canadian manufacturers,
and the erosion and suppression of Canadian carpet prices. 5 3
What is most significant about this case is how the majority and
dissent diverged with respect to their formulation and application of
the Canadian standard of review. In the first of three panel opinions,
the majority made a thorough attempt to trace the evolution of the
"patently unreasonable" test, and to articulate the requirements and
limitations of that standard.
150 The most vivid example of this is Softwood Lumber, supra note 20. In that case, the
majority and dissent wrote opinions which together were over 200 pages in length.
151 Tufted Carpet, supra note 42.
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In its attempt to trace the evolution of the "patently unreasona-
ble" test, the panel majority concluded that reviewing bodies in Can-
ada have traditionally been reluctant to review the manner in which
expert tribunals reached final determinations.154 The majority af-
firmed that the conventional approach applied by Canadian courts
was restricted to ascertaining whether or not a tribunal's determina-
tion could be sustained by "any evidence."1 55 The majority conceded
that this type of judicial review effectively precluded reviewing bodies
from examining whether agency results flowed logically from support-
ing evidence.
156
The majority then suggested that recent decisions with respect to
the "patently unreasonable" test had broadened the mandate of re-
viewing bodies. Instead of being restricted to examining whether or
not a tribunal result could be sustained by "any evidence," the panel
concluded that reviewing bodies were now required under Canadian
law to ensure that the methodology employed by the administering
agency was reasonable. For authority with respect to this change in
Canadian judicial practice, the panel majority cited the reformulation
of the "patently unreasonable" test by Justice McLachlin in Lester
(W.W.)v.U.A.J.A.P.P.I. Local 740:157
Courts should exercise caution and deference in reviewing the decisions
of specialized administrative tribunals, such as the Labour Board in this
case. This deference extends both to the determination of the facts and
the interpretation of the law. Only where the evidence, viewed reason-
ably, is incapable of supporting a tribunal's findings of facts, or where
the interpretation placed on the legislation is patently unreasonable, can
the court interfere.
158
The panel majority then offered its interpretation of this
proposition:
It is obvious from the statement "only where the evidence, viewed rea-
sonably, is incapable of supporting a tribunal's finding of fact," that the
Court is saying not only must the relevant evidence be examined but
also this evidence must be viewed reasonably. Thus, it is not a question
of whether there is no evidence, but rather whether the evidence relied on
is capable of supporting the tribunal's finding o% fact (that is, evidence that
rationally or logically supports the findings).' 
9
154 Tufted Carpets, supra note 42, Booklet B.26A (April 7, 1993) at 4.
155 Tufted Carpets, supra note 42, Booklet B.26A (April 7, 1993) at 4.
156 Tufted Carpets, supra note 42, Booklet B.26A at 5-6 (April 7, 1993). For authority on this
proposition, the panel cited various cases including Japan Electrical Manufacturers Association,
et al. v. the Anti-Dumping Tribunal, et al., 12 C.E.R. 260, 268 (F.C.A. 1987).
157 W.W. Lester (1978) Ltd. v. U.A., Local 740 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 644, 688-89.
158 Tufted Carpets, supra note 42, Booklet B.26A (April 7, 1993) at 9.
159 Tufted Carpets, supra note 42, Booklet B.26A (April 7, 1993), at 9 (emphasis added).
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After citing a number of other recent judicial propositions sup-
porting a more active judicial role, the panel formulated its own ver-
sion of the "patently unreasonable" test:
If a reviewing Panel finds that the decision of a specialized tribunal can-
not be sustained on any reasonable interpretation of the facts or where
the evidence viewed reasonably is incapable of supporting the tribunal's
findings of fact, the tribunal's decision will be deemed patently unrea-
sonable. Put another way, if a rational or logical relationship does not
exist between the evidence and the decision of the tribunal, such decision
will be deemed patently unreasonable.16°
Not surprisingly, once the panel employed this relatively exacting
approach to the CTT's final determination, it found that nearly all of
the Tribunal's conclusions were not rationally connected to supporting
evidence.
161
The two dissenters, one American and one Canadian, disagreed
with the strict standard of judicial review formulated by the majority.
Where the majority had chosen certain judicial statements to illustrate
that the standard of review had recently become more rigorous, the
dissent chose other propositions to deny that the deferential "any evi-
dence" test had been weakened or displaced. For example, where the
majority had cited Lester to justify a more expansive role for review-
ing bodies, the dissent drew upon another statement made by Justice
McLachlin in that same case to support the orthodox approach to ju-
dicial review:
If there is any evidence capable of supporting a finding of successorship,
the court will defer to the board's finding even though it may not have
reached the same conclusion. However, absent any such evidence, the
decision must fall.162
The dissenting panel chairman, a Canadian, thereafter formu-
lated his own version of the "patently unreasonable" test:
160 Tufted Carpets, supra note 42, Booklet B.26A (April 7, 1993), at 11 (emphasis added).
161 The panel majority remanded the final determination on a number of counts. First, the
panel remanded the CITT's affirmative "future injury" finding on grounds that this conclusion
lacked evidentiary support. Second, on the issue of past and present causation, the panel found
that the CITT had not considered whether non-dumping factors could have assisted the United
States industry in gaining Canadian market share. Such non-dumping factors included (i) a more
innovative and fashionable U.S. product line, (ii) better service and marketing practices associ-
ated with United States imports, and (iii) cost advantages associated with United States imports.
The panel ordered the Tribunal to examine whether these three factors could have been respon-
sible for the past material injury. Third, the panel ordered the C1TT" to ensure that FTA tariff
reductions and a strengthening Canadian dollar were not responsible for the decline in carpet
prices. The panel ordered the agency to provide more specific information as to the affects of
these factors on the Canadian industry. See Tufted Carpets, supra note 42, Booklet B.26A (April
7, 1993) at 11-22.
162 Tufted Carpets, supra note 42, Booklet B.26A (April 7, 1993) at 28 (emphasis added).
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these decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada stand for the proposi-
tion that if there is no evidence to support a finding or conclusion which
is central to the tribunal's decision, the decision is rendered patently un-
reasonable. However, if there is any evidence capable of supporting a
finding, the reviewing panel should not re-weigh the evidence. It is only
where the decision cannot be sustained on any reasonable interpretation
of the facts that a reviewing panel should intervene.'
63
Not surprisingly, since dissenters employed a standard of review
that was considerably more lenient on the Tribunal than the standard
articulated by the majority, they would have affirmed the CITT's final
determination in its entirety.
The panel's second opinion was delivered on January 21, 1994.114
Once again, the majority and dissent diverged on the applicable stan-
dard of review. The panel majority in the second opinion - which ma-
jority now included the two original dissenters as well as the newly
appointed Canadian panelist - chose not to reapply the rigorous stan-
dard of review that had been so carefully debated, formulated and
applied in the initial majority decision. Instead, the new majority con-
cluded that a more deferential approach was applicable to review of
agency redeterminations. 6 s
On the matter of past and present material injury, the majority
rejected the Tribunal's analysis. The panel found that the Tribunal
had not performed any of the analyses ordered by the panel in its
initial opinion. 66 The majority thereafter remanded for a second time
on the issue of past and present material injury, and ordered the Tri-
bunal to establish more clearly the critical nexus between dumping
and material injury.167
The outcome in Tufted Carpets was effectively decided with re-
spect to the matter of "future injury." In its redetermination on re-
mand, the Tribunal had reaffirmed that there existed a threat of
material injury to the Canadian industry. The Tribunal attributed this
threat of material injury to: (i) large United States manufacturing
overcapacity; (ii) "soft" demand conditions in the United States; and
163 Tufted Carpets, supra note 42, Booklet B.26A (April 7, 1993) at 33.
164 Tufted Carpets, supra note 42, Booklet B.26B (Jan. 21,1994). Note that a Canadian panel-
ist who had sided with the dissent in the first decision withdrew before the second decision was
issued. He was replaced with another Canadian panelist who sided with the majority in the
second panel opinion.
165 Tufted Carpets, supra note 42, Booklet B.26B (Jan. 21, 1994) at 3. As authority for its
conclusion that a more deferential standard of review applied to redeterminations on remand,
the panel cited the cursory approach adopted in Beer, supra note 41, during that panel's review
of a redetermination on remand.
166 Tufted Carpets, supra note 42, at 4-6.
167 Tufted Carpets, supra note 42, at 6.
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement 1989-95
15:525 (1995)
(iii) the need, on the part of large United States plants, to achieve
maximum operational efficiencies by producing round-the-clock. The
agency concluded that material injury was likely because these condi-
tions were "likely to persist for some time.'
'1 68
The majority affirmed the agency's "future injury" finding. With
little substantive analysis the panel held that there existed evidence in
the administrative record to support the Tribunal's findings. 69
The sole dissenting panelist, an American member of the major-
ity in the panel's initial opinion, refused to affirm the Tribunal's future
injury finding. The panelist criticized the majority for applying a more
deferential standard of review in the second panel opinion than that
formulated and applied by the majority in the initial panel decision.
170
The dissenting panelist argued that the "patently unreasonable" stan-
dard required that each Tribunal conclusion be sustained with sup-
porting evidence. Employing this relatively strict approach, the
dissent rejected the Tribunal's redetermination on two grounds. First,
it found that the Tribunal had not clarified which of the aforemen-
tioned three factual conclusions was essential to its determination of
future injury. It would have ordered the Tribunal in a second redeter-
mination to state exactly which of its factual conclusions was funda-
mental to its finding of future injury.17 1 Second, the dissenting
panelist could not find evidence in the administrative record capable
of supporting a conclusion that "soft" United States demand would
persist into the future.172 Again, the dissent would have remanded on
this issue for further clarification. The dissent concluded by stating
that since the panel majority was already remanding on the issue of
past and present injury, it was not unreasonable to request the Tribu-
nal to further substantiate its affirmative future injury finding. 73
In its second redetermination on remand, the Tribunal concluded
that there existed no past and present material injury to the Canadian
industry. 174 The Canadian Carpet Institute sought panel review of this
finding. At the same time, the American petitioners requested that
168 See Tufted Carpets, supra note 42, at 6. The CIT also based its final determination on
certain of the recommendations specified by the "Committee on Antidumping Practices" issued
pursuant to Article 3:6 of the GATT Antidumping Code.
169 Tufted Carpets, supra note 42, at 9.
170 Tufted Carpets, supra note 42, at 11-12.
171 Tufted Carpets, supra note 42, at 10.
172 Tufted Carpets, supra note 42, at 11.
173 Tufted Carpets, supra note 42, at 12.
174 In the Matter of a Remand under Section 77.15 of the Special Import Measures Act Re-
specting Machine Tufted Carpeting Originating in or Exported from the United States of
America, CDA-92-1904-02, 1994 FTAPD LEXIS 7, *8 (Feb. 11, 1994).
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the binational panel reconsider its previous affirmation of the CIT's
"future injury" finding.
In its third opinion, the panel unanimously affirmed the Tribu-
nal's finding that there existed no past and present injury. 175 The
panel, however, refused to accede to the U.S. exporter's request that
the affirmative "future injury" determination be reconsidered. 76 This
decision was sufficient to defeat the United States petitioner's applica-
tion for relief.
17 7
Tufted Carpets illustrates two reasons why American exporters
had so little success when appealing CITT final determinations to
Chapter 19 panels. First, the presence of a privative clause limited
how stringently the panel could challenge CITT findings. Rather than
being able to examine alleged "errors of law" strictly, the panel was
confined by the highly deferential "patently unreasonable" test. Had
the panel been able to apply the standard of "reasonableness" to the
alleged error of law - as it would have in review of a Revenue Canada
determination - the panel may have remanded the Tribunal's affirma-
tive "future injury" finding. That the panel upheld the CMJT on the
"future injury" issue is, in large part, a testament to the deferential
nature of the "patently unreasonable" test and the standard of review
applicable to CT final determinations.
Second, the case demonstrates how panels reviewing CIT deter-
minations have been inconsistent when determining how much defer-
ence is required by the "patently unreasonable" test. Rather than re-
affirm its commitment to the strict standard of review so carefully de-
veloped and applied in its initial decision, the panel majority in the
second opinion opted for a more lenient version of the standard of
review. The majority made no reference to the list of judicial proposi-
tions that had been adopted in the initial panel opinion; instead, it
chose to apply a more deferential version of the "patently unreasona-
ble" test. 'With the employment of this more acquiescent standard, the
panel upheld the Tribunal's questionable "future injury"
determination.
While the employment of this deferential standard of review in
the second panel opinion in Tufted Carpets inhibited the ability of the
U.S. exporters to secure relief, and while this approach arguably con-
175 Tufted Carpets, supra note 42, Booklet B.26C (April 21, 1994) at 8.
176 Tufted Carpets, supra note 42, Booklet B.26C (April 21, 1994) at 5.
177 SIMA allows the Tribunal to find material injury if the agency finds either (i) past and
present material injury; (ii) future injury; or (iii) both past/present and future injury. Thus, if the
Tribunal finds that a threat of future injury exists by way of dumped imports, an affirmative
material injury finding may be upheld by a reviewing body.
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travenes the intention behind the FTA to reduce non-tariff barriers to
trade, to apply this acquiescent standard of review to CITT findings is
simply to adhere to well-established principles of Canadian adminis-
trative law. In Canada, in the face of a privative clause, reviewing
bodies cannot - as the first panel majority in Tufted Carpets discovered
- command an expert tribunal to demonstrate that a "rational connec-
tion" exists between conclusions and supporting evidence. Although
such an outcome was unfortunate from the perspective of U.S. export-
ers, any deviation from this approach would violate Canadian admin-
istrative law and tradition.
In the five other cases where Chapter 19 panels reviewed C1TT
findings, all five final determinations were upheld in their entirety in
initial panel decisions.178 In those cases, alleged CITT mistakes were
routinely examined as "errors of law" and, hence, the "patently unrea-
sonable" test was applied as a matter of course. Unlike the first panel
majority in Tufted Carpets, the panels in these cases did not attempt to
survey Canadian jurisprudence with a view toward developing an un-
yielding standard of review. Instead, panels routinely accepted the
traditional "any evidence/curial deference" approach to the "patently
unreasonable" test.
In summary, American exporters were unsuccessful when appeal-
ing CITT' final determinations for three main reasons. First, because
it is difficult to categorize a CITT' mistake as one of jurisdiction, bina-
tional panels reviewed most alleged errors as "errors of law." Second,
because of the existence of a privative clause, alleged CITT "errors of
law" were reviewed by way of the highly deferential "patently unrea-
sonable" test. Third, binational panels reviewing CITI final determi-
nations did not consistently attempt to articulate and apply a stringent
version of the "patently unreasonable" test. As a consequence of
these three factors, panels routinely upheld CIT conclusions so long
as there has existed "any evidence" in support of them.
Given that panels were quite deferential to C1TI final determina-
tions, and that this was driven in large part by the existence of a "priv-
ative" clause, one would have expected that the absence of such
statutory protection for Revenue Canada findings would have re-
sulted in more rigorous panel examination of Revenue Canada final
determinations. It is to this issue that we now turn.
178 These cases were Hot Rolled Steel Sheet, supra note 46, Cold Rolled Steel Sheet, supra note
43, Hot Rolled Steel Plate, supra note 47, Pipe Fittings, supra note 45, and Induction Motors,
supra note 40.
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3. The Revenue Canada Standard of Review
Revenue Canada final determinations, like those of the CIlT,
can be appealed on any of the three grounds listed in the Federal
Court Act sec. 28(1).179 Hence, if Revenue Canada exceeds its juris-
diction, or commits an error of law or fact, the agency's final determi-
nation can be remanded for "redetermination."
The absence of a privative clause with respect to Revenue Can-
ada final determinations is most significant in relation to alleged er-
rors of law. Where CITT errors of law could be reviewed only by way
of the "patently unreasonable" test, alleged Revenue Canada errors
of law may be examined by way of the "reasonableness" standard.
Canadian courts have held that a reviewing body should not in-
terfere with Revenue Canada's interpretation of the SIMA unless that
interpretation is not reasonable or is clearly wrong.80 If there is more
than one reasonable interpretation of the SIMA, a reviewing body
must not substitute its judgment for that of Revenue Canada unless
the agency is not reasonable, or is clearly wrong.' Again, this is a
highly deferential standard of review.
4. Revenue Canada Cases
Under the FTA four cases were completed where panels issued
opinions reviewing Revenue Canada final determinations. As illus-
trated in Part I of this Study, American exporters did not realize re-
ductions in antidumping duty levels in any of these cases. Instead,
antidumping duties were actually increased in three instances follow-
ing appeal to Chapter 19 panels.
Binational panels examining Revenue Canada determinations
were required primarily to consider alleged agency "errors of law."
While there were a few instances where alleged Revenue Canada mis-
takes were categorized as errors of fact, the overwhelming majority of
issues which panels analyzed were alleged errors of law. As such, the
"reasonableness" standard was applied as a matter of course.
Generally speaking, binational panels applied the reasonableness
standard rigorously. This stands in stark contrast to the generally def-
erential approach which panels took to CITT final determinations,
and approximates the manner in which panels examined United States
agency final determinations. The four panel decisions reviewing Rev-
179 FCA, supra note 118.
180 Canadian Pacific Limited v. Canadian Transport Commission, 79 N.R. 13, 16-17 (F.C.A.
1987).
181 Id.
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enue Canada final determinations were thoroughly considered and
persuasively reasoned. In all four cases, panels rejected Revenue
Canada's interpretation of the SIMA as "unreasonable," and re-
manded to the agency for redetermination.
If binational panels stringently examined Revenue Canada deter-
minations, what, then, accounts for the fact that duty levels often in-
creased following panel review? This strange result is not as
paradoxical as it first may appear. What must be remembered when
considering these cases is that both American exporters and their Ca-
nadian competitors challenged Revenue Canada final determinations
before binational panels. Where American exporters argued that
Revenue Canada's misinterpretation of the SIMA resulted in the cal-
culation of a duty level which was too high, Canadian parties con-
tended that the agency made other errors of statutory interpretation
which resulted in the calculation of too low of a duty level. While
binational panels accepted the arguments of both parties, and re-
manded to Revenue Canada accordingly, the agency's recalculations
led to the imposition of higher overall duty levels. An examination of
Gypsum Board'82 well illustrates this phenomenon.
Gypsum Board from the United States
In December 1992, Revenue Canada issued a final determination
in which it found that eight American companies had dumped gypsum
board in Canada at a weighted average margin of 27.28%. This final
determination was challenged on two grounds. First, American ex-
porters argued that Revenue Canada had made an error of law when
it chose a two month "Period of Investigation" ("POI"). The Ameri-
can parties asserted that the choice of this period was prejudicial to
them because it artificially increased the level of antidumping duties.
Furthermore, they alleged that this choice of a March-April POI con-
travened prior Revenue Canada practice.183
182 See Gypsum Board, supra note 27.
183 SIMA § 3 dictates that antidumping duty levels are equal to the price charged by the
exporter for the product in the country of export ("normal value") reduced by the price charged
by the exporter for the "like"product in Canada ("export price"). The objective of Revenue
Canada in selecting a POI is to select a period which accurately reflects the exporters' normal
value and export price. Canadian trade laws and regulations do not provide for a standard POI,
so Revenue Canada has a significant amount of discretion in choosing one. The American par-
ties in this case alleged that Revenue Canada had been unreasonable because it chose a period
of investigation where the petitioning exporters had increased their price charged to United
States customers, but where those exporters had not yet passed the price increase on to their
Canadian customers. The American petitioners argued that since a price increase was made on
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On the other major issue in review, Canadian producers of gyp-
sum board alleged that Revenue Canada had erred by not including
certain interest expense when calculating the United States exporters'
cost of production. Had the agency included these expenses, they ar-
gued, it would have calculated higher normal values and, hence,
greater dumping margins.'" 4
The panel rejected Revenue Canada's treatment of the P0I issue.
While the panel acknowledged that deference was to be accorded the
agency, it found that Revenue Canada's refusal to select a more repre-
sentative POI was clearly unreasonable. The panel concluded that the
complaints of the United States exporters were meritorious, and
thereafter remanded the issue to Revenue Canada with an order to
recalculate normal values and export prices using a more representa-
tive POT.'8 5
With respect to the matter of interest expense, the panel again
carefully surveyed what was required by the SIMA, and again rejected
the approach that had been taken by Revenue Canada as "unreasona-
ble." The panel found that every type of corporate expenditure, no
matter how extraordinary or unrelated to production, had to be allo-
cated to all products in some reasonable manner.18 6 The panel re-
manded this matter to Revenue Canada with an order to allocate
interest expense to the United States exporters' costs of production.'3s
In its redetermination on remand, Revenue Canada complied
with the panel's instructions. The agency lengthened the POI from
two months to a more representative four month period, and appor-
tioned to the respective United States exporters the interest expense
associated with their corporate parents' activities. While the exten-
sion of the POI led to a decrease in antidumping levels, the inclusion
of the interest expense in normal value calculations had the effect of
increasing duty levels. In the end, the increase in the duty level
caused by the inclusion of interest expense exceeded the decrease in
their exports to Canada shortly after the end of the POI, a longer POI would have been more
representative of their position. Gypsum Board, supra note 27, at 6-9.
184 SIMA § 19(b) requires Revenue Canada to calculate an exporter's cost of production by
including certain interest expense. SIMA, c. 25, 1984 S.C. 739, 758 (Can.). The American ex-
porters had argued before Revenue Canada that certain interest expenses related to leveraged
buy-outs were not related to their production or operations, but rather were expenses associated
with the activities of their parent companies. Revenue Canada accepted this argument, and in its
final determination excluded interest expense when calculating the exporters' cost of production
and normal values.
185 Gypsum Board, supra note 27, at 17-18.
186 Gypsum Board, supra note 27, at 27-28.
187 See Gypsum Board, supra note 27, at 28.
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the duty caused by extending the P01 so that the overall weighted
average antidumping duty level rose.8 8
The panel's treatment of the issues in dispute in Gypsum Board
was rigorous and detailed. In particular, its disposition of the "interest
expense" issue was informative. To date, no previous final determina-
tion had dealt with interpreting this section of the Special Import
Measures Act and the relevant regulations. The panel's decision that
interest expense incurred by a corporate parent had to be apportioned
amongst subsidiaries clarified what had heretofore been an undevel-
oped aspect of Canadian trade law.'8 9
The outcome in Gypsum Board is reflective of how the other
cases brought against Revenue Canada were decided. In Beer-Dump-
ing'90 and Tufted Carpets,i9' American exporters and members of the
Canadian industry challenged Revenue Canada final determinations.
In both of those cases, panels examined the alleged agency errors of
law in an unyielding manner. However, in both cases, recalculation of
the initial duty level following redeterminations on remand again led
to small increases in overall duty levels.
In summary, binational panel review of Revenue Canada final
determinations has been stringent. While duty levels increased for
American exporters, one should not conclude that this has been the
result of excessive panel deference to agency findings. If panels con-
tinue under NAFTA to apply this exacting mode of review in future
Revenue Canada cases, antidumping duty levels are likely to decline.
We have seen that binational panels have examined CITT find-
ings deferentially, but that consideration of final Revenue Canada de-
terminations has been relatively exacting. We will now examine the
United States standard of review and how binational panels have ap-
plied that standard to United States agency final determinations. As
will be explained, panels have been consistent in the approach that
they have taken to both ITA and ITC final determinations.
188 In Feb. 1994, Revenue Canada's redetermination on remand was fied with the U.S.-Can-
ada FTA Binational Secretariat. In the Matter of Gypsum (Dumping), CDA-93-1904-01, 1994
FTAPD Lexis, 3, *5 (Feb. 16, 1994). The Panel thereafter affirmed the redetermination on re-
mand. In the matter of Gypsum Board Originating in or Exported from the United States,
Order Pursuant to Subrule 75(4) (Mar. 24, 1994).
189 Revenue Canada officials have privately welcomed this panel report as the judgment
made clear what the agency's responsibilities will be the next time that it faces a similar issue.
190 Beer-Dumping, supra note 24.
191 Tufted Carpets-AD, supra note 26.
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B. Cases Reviewing United States Agency Determinations
1. The United States Standard of Review
The standard of review to be applied in Chapter 19 panel review
of a United States agency final determination has been statutorily
framed as follows:
The court shall hold unlawful any determination, finding, or conclusion
found... to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.
192
The United States standard of review provides binational panels
with two prongs of review authority. First, a panel may find that the
ITA or ITC has made a determination not supported by substantial
evidence on the record. Second, panels are to ensure that agencies
have not made errors of law when making final determinations. In
this respect, binational panels are once again to consider:
the relevant statutes, legislative history, regulations, administrative prac-
tice, and judicial precedents to the extent that a court of the importing
Party would rely on such materials in reviewing a final determination of
the competent investigating authority. 193
a. The "Errors of Law" Test
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council94 is
one of the most important decisions in U.S. administrative law. 95
Chevron stands for the proposition that in determining whether an
agency's application and interpretation of a statute is "in accordance
with law," a court need not conclude that "the agency's interpretation
is the only reasonable construction or the one this court would adopt
had the question initially arisen in a judicial proceeding.' 1 96 Instead, a
reviewing court must determine on judicial review whether the
agency's conclusion is based on a "permissible" construction of the
statute.97
U.S. courts generally have applied the Chevron principle to judi-
cial review of ITA and ITC final determinations. In so doing, the
courts have granted U.S. agencies broad discretion in their administra-
tion of U.S. trade remedy laws.198 Where the agencies have employed
192 Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (1995) (emphasis added).
193 FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(2).
194 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (hereinafter "Chevron").
195 1 Kenneth Davis and Richard J. Pierce, ADMmrsaRA'rvE LAw TREATISE § 32, at 110
(1994).
196 Id. at 843, n. 11.
197 Id. at 842-43.
198 See PPG Industries, Inc. v. United States, 928 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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a choice of methodology that was not specifically authorized by stat-
ute, the courts have often cited the following proposition in upholding
that choice:
If... Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue,
the court does not simply impose its own construction of the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute ...
If the agency's choice represents a reasonable accommodation of con-
flicting policies that were committed to the agency's care by the statute,
we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legisla-
tive history that the accommodation is not one the Congress would have
sanctioned.199
Although the Chevron principle of "deference" has been fol-
lowed regularly when aggrieved foreign exporters have challenged
ITA and ]TC final determinations before the CIT, U.S. courts have
recently weakened this approach to judicial review.2°° For example, in
Dole v. United Steelmakers,2"' the U.S. Supreme Court did not apply
the Chevron test to see if the Office of Management and Budget
("OMB") had adopted a permissible reading of the Paperwork Re-
duction Act. Instead, the court remanded after concluding that the
OMB had not applied "the most natural" interpretation of that stat-
ute.2 °2 Other recent cases have similarly diluted the classic Chevron
principle of deference and have espoused a more activist judicial role
for review of agency determinations.0 3
b. The "Substantial Evidence" Test
U.S. courts have invariably begun any discussion of the "substan-
tial evidence" test by citing the following well-established proposition:
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such rele-
vant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.2 4
199 United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961).
200 See Pierce, supra note 195, § 3.5, at 130.
201 110 S. Ct. 929 (1990).
202 Id. at 934.
203 See, for example, K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281,291 (1988) and INS v. Car-
doza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447-48 (1987). But see Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496
U.S. 633, 647 (1990) and Lechmere v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536 (1992), where the Supreme
Court reaffirmed its commitment to the Chevron test.
204 Matasushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. United States, 750 F. 2d 927, 933 (Fed. Cir.
1984)(citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
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The substantial evidence test requires the reviewing authority to
accord broad deference to an expert agency's statutory interpretation,
as well as to the methodologies selected and applied by that agency.
Deference has been found to be especially applicable to factual find-
ings made by an expert agency.20 5 Even where a view opposing the
agency's may appear to be reasonable, courts have held that "it is not
the ambit of the Court to choose the view which it would have chosen
in a trial de novo, as long as the agency's decision is supported by
substantial evidence.
2 06
Notwithstanding the generally deferential approach which the
courts have taken to the substanitial evidence test, there do exist pro-
positions in United States jurisprudence that limit the amount of dis-
cretion reviewing bodies will grant expert government agencies. U.S.
courts have held that when assessing the substantiality of the evidence
during judicial review, reviewing bodies must consider the evidence
on the record as a whole, including the "body of evidence opposed to
the [agency's] view. '2°7 Those courts have also held that: (i) review-
able determinations may be remanded if they lack a "reasoned" ba-
sis;208 and (ii) a reviewing authority may not defer to an agency
determination premised on inadequate analysis or reasoning.0 9
This brief examination of cases reviewing the U.S. standard of
review shows that U.S. appellate courts have been unable to articulate
clearly how much deference must be accorded to final determinations
of expert agencies. These judicial decisions illustrate that determin-
ing what constitutes "substantial evidence" and what may be deemed
an "error of law" involves subjective judgment.
An examination of the following three cases will demonstrate
that Chapter 19 panels have used the latitude which exists in United
States jurisprudence to formulate a relatively unyielding U.S. standard
of review. The consequent employment of this rigorous standard has
forced United States agencies to provide reasoned determinations
where conclusions flow logically from supporting evidence.
205 See Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. 474, 480-81 (1951), and Smith-Corona Group v.
United States, 713 F. 2d 1568, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984).
206 See Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 673 F. Supp. 454, 479 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
207 Universal Camera, supra note 205, at 477 (1951) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
208 American Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F .d 994, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
209 USX Corp. v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 487, 492 (CIT 1987).
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2. Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada
Pork210 has been chosen because it is representative of how
Chapter 19 panels formulated and applied the "substantial evidence"
test during the FTA years. From the perspective of Canadian export-
ers, the way that the panel employed the "substantial evidence test"
was encouraging. From the viewpoint of the ITC, the panel's conclu-
sions and directions were unduly intrusive.211
In the "subsidies" phase of the Pork dispute, the ITA had found
that various federal and provincial agricultural assistance programs
had conferred "countervailable" benefits on Canadian producers of
fresh, chilled and frozen pork.212 This decision was appealed by Cana-
dian exporters to a binational panel.213 At the same time, a binational
panel was requested to examine a final determination of the ITC2 14 in
which that agency had found that imports of pork from Canada were
presently posing a "threat" of material injury to the United States in-
dustry within the meaning of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended.21 5
In its final determination, the ITC had concluded that the
countervailable subsidies conferred on Canadian pork would increase
Canadian production at a rate which would exceed the anticipated in-
crease in Canadian consumption. The ITC reasoned that this excess
of production over consumption would be exported to the United
States and that as a result, the American industry would suffer injury
by way of "price suppression."
The ITC supported its conclusion with various questionable sta-
tistics. When justifying in their final determination why so little evi-
dence had been submitted in support of their conclusions, a majority
of the Commissioners stated that "determinations of a threat of injury
are inherently less amenable to quantification because of the fact that
they involve projection of future events.
216
210 Pork, supra note 30.
211 For a more detailed examination of the Pork case, see Andreas Lowenfeld, The Free Trade
Agreement Meets its First Challenge. Dispute Settlement and the Pork Case, 37 McGiLL LJ. 597
(1992).
212 Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,774 (ITA 1989) (final
determination).
213 Pork-CVD, supra note 21. For a detailed examination ofhow binational panels demanded
"rational" United States agency decision making in Pork-CVD, see also BODDEZ AND TREBIL-
cocK, supra note 37, at 123-52.
214 Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada, 54 Fed. Reg. 37,838 (ITC 1989) (final
determination).
215 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1994).
216 Supra note 214. The majority relied for precedential support on Hannibal Industries Inc. v.
United States, 710 F. Supp. 332, 338 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989).
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The evidence adduced to support the affirmative "threat of mate-
rial injury" determination was thin. The ITC had found that the pro-
duction of Canadian pork had increased from two billion pounds in
1986 to 2.6 billion pounds in 1988. The agency had then inferred from
this statistic that the excess of production over consumption in Can-
ada - 600 million pounds - would be exported to the United States.217
In its initial opinion, the binational panel spent a considerable
amount of time examining the United States standard of review. The
panel initiated its careful analysis by recognizing that United States
jurisprudence required "great deference" to be accorded to the find-
ings of administrative agencies. 218 The panel then carefully surveyed
leading cases in United States administrative law to articulate a rela-
tively strict "substantial evidence" test. To support its position, the
panel summarized its understanding of the "substantial evidence" test
by referring to a number of well-established United States judicial
propositions:
In assessing the evidence, the Panel must consider the Record as a
whole, including evidence on the Record which detracts from the sub-
stantiality of the evidence relied on by the agency making its determina-
tion... The proscription against a Panel reweighing the evidence does
not foreclose a Panel from ever deciding that an ITC determination is
unsupported by substantial evidence; nor is the deference properly owed
to the ITC's determination without limits. The panel may not permit the
agency "under the guise of lawful discretion or interpretation to contra-
vene or ignore the intent of Congress."
219
After the panel formulated this relatively unyielding version of
the United States "substantial evidence" requirement, it applied the
test to the ITC final determination. After careful review of all of the
issues in dispute, the panel concluded that the ITC's "threat of mate-
rial injury" finding was not sustainable because it lacked evidentiary
support.220 One of the panelists made the following observation:
not only were there inaccuracies in the interpretation of basic produc-
tion data underlying the majority (ITC) opinion but, in addition, there
are a number of areas in which there were, in my opinion, an incom-
217 Prior to its final determination, the ITC had evidence on hand that appeared to detract
from the strength of its conclusions. For example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture had pro-
vided evidence to show that the "increase" in Canadian pork production was the result of a
change by the Canadian Department of Agriculture in the method of counting and reporting
pork production. Further, the Canadian Meat Council had provided evidence that the actual
increase in pork production was 170 million lbs., not 600 million. This evidence was apparently
never examined by the ITC.
218 Pork, supra note 30, Booklet B.8A at 8 (Aug. 24 1990).
219 Pork, supra note 30, Booklet B.8A at 9.
220 Pork, suprq note 30, Booklet B.8A at 27-28.
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pleteness in the analytical logic which linked cause (various factors) and
effect (threat of injury).22 1
The effect of the panel's analysis was to undermine a significant
portion of the ITC's reasoning. The matter was remanded to the ITC
for redetermination.
In its redetermination on remand, the ITC re-opened the admin-
istrative record and admitted new evidence as to the threat of material
injury.222 The ITC now suggested that "product-shifting" was the un-
derlying cause of the "threat" of material injury.
The ITC's theory was based on its prediction that increases in
subsidy payments on hogs in Canada would lead to the imposition by
the ITA of a higher CVD on Canadian imports of live swine. The ITC
reasoned that these higher duty levels on swine would cause Canadian
swine producers to sell more of their product to Canadian pork produ-
cers, who would then respond by producing more pork. The ITC con-
cluded that since some of this increased Canadian pork production
would be exported to the United States, there existed a "threat" of
material injury to the United States industry.
2 3
This new theory appeared to be as tenuous as its predecessor.
The panel, in its second panel opinion, rejected the ITC's new ration-
ale for lack of evidentiary support. The "substantial evidence" test
was again employed, and the panel found that the theory of "product-
shifting" was mere "conjecture." Since the new theory did not but-
tress the ITC's determination of "threat of material injury," the panel
ordered the ITC to find that Canadian pork imports posed "no" threat
of material injury to American industry. 2'
In its second redetermination on remand, the ITC complied with
panel instructions and concluded that there existed no threat of mate-
rial injury to the American industry.225 However, the tone of the
ITC's redetermination was noticeably acrimonious. The agency al-
leged that the panel had egregiously intruded into its factual decision-
making capacity, "impermissibly" reweighed evidence, and clearly vi-
olated the FTA's mandate by applying a standard of review inconsis-
tent with that required by United States law.2
221 Pork, supra note 30, Booklet B.8A at 48.
222 In the Matter of Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork from Canada, Views on Remand, Inv. No.
701-TA-298, USITC Pub. No. 2230 (Oct. 1990).
223 Id.
224 Pork, supra note 30, Booklet B.8B (Jan. 24, 1991) at 51.
225 Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork From Canada, Second Remand Determination, Inv. No.
701-TA-298 (Feb. 12, 1990).
226 Id.
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After this episode, the U.S. government had to decide whether or
not to seek an Extraordinary Challenge Committee to review the
ITC's allegations.22 7 In so doing, the U.S. government was forced to
recognize that the FTA set a higher threshold for ECC action than the
standard for an appeal in the U.S. court system. The FTA stipulated
that an ECC could only vacate or remand a panel's decision if:
a) i) a member of the panel was guilty of gross misconduct, bias, or a
serious conflict of interest, or otherwise materially violated the rules
of conduct,
ii) the panel seriously departed from a fundamental rule of proce-
dure, or
ii) the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or jurisdiction
set forth in this Article, and
b) any of the actions set out in subparagraph (a) has materially affected
the panel's decision and threatens the integrity of the binational panel
review process 2 8
The U.S.T.R. proceeded to request the formation of an ECC to
address the issue of whether or not the panel had applied a "de novo"
standard of review instead of the correct standard of "substantial evi-
dence on the record.
'229
The Extraordinary Challenge Committee, in a unanimous opin-
ion, concluded that so long as a panel made a conscientious attempt to
articulate and apply the United States standard of review, it would not
interfere with a panel's conclusion. Only a "manifest" breach of this
duty would justify vacating a panel decision. 3 0 Applying this maxim
to the ITC allegations, the Committee was satisfied that the panel had
not breached its mandate. -
Pork exemplifies why Canadian exporters have enjoyed such a
high degree of success by way of the Chapter 19 process. The case
illustrates three important phenomena.
First, the binational panel carefully demonstrated, through its ex-
amination of United States jurisprudence, that the United States stan-
dard of review could be formulated and applied in such a way so as to
effectively force United States agencies to support their conclusions
with substantial reasoning. The ECC's approval of the panel's second
opinion basically validated the notion that panels could construct and
employ a relatively exacting "substantial evidence" test. This decision
227 The FTA Extraordinary Challenge Committee procedure could only be invoked at the
request of either the Canadian or U.S. government. FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(13).
228 FTA, supra note 1, art. 1904(13).
229 Pork ECC, supra note 93, at 25.
230 Pork ECC, supra note 93, at 27.
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was a resounding victory for those who have expressed their concern
with the administration of United States trade remedy laws.231
Second, the panel in Pork formulated and applied an unyielding
standard of review in both its initial opinion and in its subsequent re-
view of the ITC's redetermination on remand. This stands in sharp
comparison to panel review of CITr final determinations. As was il-
lustrated in Beer and Carpets, even when Chapter 19 panels have
stringently examined CITT determinations in initial decisions, they
rarely conducted subsequent reviews of Tribunal redeterminations
with the same level of intensity.
Third, Pork demonstrated that the Extraordinary Challenge
Committee was not to function as an ordinary appellate court. The
Pork Committee established that a panel's decision could be re-
manded or vacated only if the panel had "manifestly" exceeded its
mandate in a way which threatened the integrity of the Chapter 19
process. Although the Committee did not identify what level of panel
misconduct would constitute a "manifest" breach of mandate, the
Committee's decision reinforced the notion that panel decisions were
to be dispositive of the issue in dispute.
3. Live Swine from Canada232
Where Pork showed how the "substantial evidence" test could be
used to essentially overturn a U.S. agency final determination, Live
Swine exemplifies how panels employed the "errors of law" test to
discipline United States agencies. The case provides another clear il-
lustration of how panels have used the flexibility provided by U.S.
administrative law jurisprudence to require more rational agency deci-
sion-making.
In 1991, the ITA found that nine Canadian programs were "de
facto" limited to a "specific" group of agricultural commodities.
233
Among these programs were the Canadian National Tripartite Stabili-
zation Scheme for Hogs ("Tripartite") and the Quebec Farm Income
Insurance Program ("FISI"). The official purpose of these two pro-
grams was to provide direct payments to farmers whose income had
been reduced due to adverse changes in commodity prices.
231 See generally, ALAN M. RuOMAN ND ANDREw D.M. ANDERSON, ADMINISTERED PRO.
TEcrION IN A M UCA (1987); and Anderson and Rugman, supra note 100.
232 See supra note 52.
233 These conclusions were made during the ITA's fourth administrative review of the CVD
order on live swine as published in Live Swine from Canada; Final Results of Countervailing
Duty Administrative Review, 56 Fed. Reg. 28531 (June 21, 1991).
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The ITA identified Canadian producers of live swine as benefi-
ciaries of these programs. As a result of this finding, the ITA con-
cluded that benefits received by producers of live swine were
"countervailable." Thereafter, the ITA applied CVDs of Cdn.$ .0047/
lb. on Canadian exports of sows and boars, and Cdn.$ .0049/lb. on
exports of all other live swine. Canadian exporters sought binational
panel review of these findings.
The main issue in Live Swine concerned whether Tripartite and
FISI were "de facto specific" as defined by 1988 amendments to the
Tariff Act of 1930. "De facto specificity" was - and remains to be - an
extremely controversial area of U.S. countervailing duty law.23 4 The
process of determining what satisfies the "de facto specificity" test has
been a source of considerable confusion in the past for the ITA, as
well as for reviewing courts. Before proceeding, some explanation of
this concept may be useful.
Prior to 1988, the ITA applied U.S. countervailing duty law by
analyzing whether a foreign government had made benefits available
generally to a foreign enterprise or industry. If the ITA found that
such benefits had been conferred on a foreign item or product that
was later exported to the United States, the ITA could penalize the
subject imports with countervailing duties. This methodology was tra-
ditionally referred to as the "general availability" approach.
This approach to determining which foreign subsidies were
"countervailable" appeared unduly broad and thus impractical. The
test theoretically allowed the ITA to find as "countervailable" such
benefits as highways, education, and other "grants" that governments
routinely provided to their populations at large. In 1985, a U.S. court
rejected the "general availability" test.23 5
What has come to be known as the "specificity test" was statuto-
rily enacted immediately thereafter.23 6 The test, grounded in the defi-
nition of "subsidy" provided in sec. 771(5) of the Tariff Act of 1930,
stipulated that domestic subsidies were only "countervailable" if they
were "provided to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enter-
prises or industries.
2 37
234 For a comprehensive examination of the evolution of United States CVD law, see Richard
Diamond, A Search For Economic Principles in the Administration of United States Counter-
vailing Duty Law, 21 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 507 (1990).
235 Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 722, 732 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), appeal dis-
missed, 788 F. 2d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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While the "de facto specificity" test reduced the scope of Ameri-
can countervailing duty law, careful steps were taken by Congres-
sional drafters to maintain portions of the antecedent, wider, "general
availability" test. A "Special Rule"23 8 was enacted to allow the ITA
to categorize a subsidy as "specific" - and hence "countervailable" -
even though that subsidy may also have been "generally available."
This enactment bestowed considerable discretion on the ITA, and al-
lowed United States countervailing duty law to retain an important
part of its mandate.
Following the enactment of this "Special Rule," the Department
of Commerce issued "Proposed Regulations" that described how it
planned to perform its "specificity" analysis.3 9 The relevant parts of
the Regulations are as follows:
(b)(1) Selective treatment, and a potential countervailable domestic
subsidy, exists where the Secretary determines that benefits under a pro-
gram are provided, or are required to be provided, in law or in fact, to a
specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries.
(2) In determining whether benefits are specific under paragraph
(b)(1) of this section, the Secretary will consider, among other things,
the following factors:
(i) The extent to which a government acts to limit the availability of
a program:
(ii) The number of enterprises, industries, or groups thereof that ac-
tually use a program;
(iii) Whether there are dominant users of a program, or whether
certain enterprises, industries, or groups thereof receive dispropor-
tionately large benefits under a program; and
(iv) The extent to which a government exercises discretion in con-
ferring benefits under a program.24
In its final determination in Live Swine, the ITA asserted that
Tripartite was "countervailable" under U.S. law. The ITA drew this
conclusion after it found that only ten Canadian agricultural commod-
ities benefited from this Canadian program when the 'universe' of po-
tential beneficiaries of the program was over a hundred products.
With respect to FISI, the ITA found that only thirteen commodities
had received assistance from the Quebec government while sixty-nine
agricultural commodities were actually produced in Quebec. Given
the relatively small number of commodities insured by both programs,
238 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B).
239 These factors have been codified by Commerce at paragraph 355.43(b) of the Proposed
Regulations. 54 Fed. Reg. 23366, 23379.
240 Id. Note that while the Department stated that each of the four factors had to be "consid-
ered," it did not state that the presence of each of these factors was necessary to ground an
affirmative finding of "specificity."
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the ITA found that the number of commodities covered by the pro-
grams were "too few" to justify a finding of "non-specificity." Both
programs were thereafter deemed "de facto specific" because their
benefits were limited to a small number of industries, even though,
theoretically, those benefits were "generally available."
The principal issue in dispute before the Chapter 19 Panel was
whether the ITA had interpreted the 1988 amendment to the Tariff
Act of 1930241 and its own Proposed Regulations reasonably. Given
that (i) the amended statute was silent as to how the "specificity test"
was to be administered, and that (ii) the Department's Proposed Reg-
ulations were ambiguous as to how many of its criteria had to be con-
sidered before an affirmative "specificity" finding could be made,
reviewing bodies were required under United States law to defer to
the agency's statutory interpretation so long as that interpretation was
"reasonable."24 2
The Chapter 19 panel in Live Swine initiated its review of the
ITA's final determination by articulating the same strict standard of
review that had been formulated and applied in Pork. In so doing, the
panel surveyed a number of judicial propositions and concluded:
a reviewing court is not barred from setting aside [an agency] decision
when it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that
decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its
entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the
[agency's] view 243
After outlining the applicable standard of review, the panel pro-
ceeded to examine in considerable detail recent United States juris-
prudence concerning the "specificity" test and the Department's
"Proposed Regulations." After reviewing recent cases, the panel sum-
marized the judicial test that had to be applied to a review of the
ITA's "specificity" analysis:
"Commerce does not perform a proper de facto analysis if it merely
looks at the number of companies that receive benefits under [a] pro-
gram." Roses Inc. v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 1376, 1380 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1991). "It is not the sheer number of the enterprises receiving
benefits that dictates whether or not a program is countervailable." Id.
at 1384. Rather, Commerce must examine all relevant factors to deter-
mine whether "if, in its application, the program [at issue] results in a
subsidy only to a specific enterprise or industry or specific group of en-
terprises or industries." PPG Industries, supra, at 1576 (emphasis in
241 Supra note 236.
242 Chevron, supra note 194, at 843.
243 In the Matter of Live Swine from Canada, No. USA-91-1904-03, 1992 FrAPD Lexis 1
(May 19, 1992) at *11-12 (citing Universal Camera, supra note 205, at 488).
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original). To fulfill this requirement, Commerce must comply with its
own proposed regulations, as expressly approved by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit, in PPG Industries, Id, and it "must exer-
cise judgment and balance various factors in analyzing the facts of a
particular case in order to determine whether an 'unfair' practice is tak-
ing place."
244
When the panel applied this stringent mode of judicial review in
its first opinion, it found "unreasonable" the ITA's conclusion that
Tripartite and FISI were de facto specific. 245 The panel found that: (i)
the ITA's final determination resulted solely from an application of
only one of the criteria of the Proposed Regulations, i.e. that the
number of program recipients was small relative to the universe of
potential beneficiaries; and (ii) the ITA had failed to consider the
other factors which were required by the agency under its own Pro-
posed Regulations. The panel remanded the decision to the ITA on
grounds that the final determination was "not in accordance with U.S.
law.,,3246
In its redetermination on remand the ITA re-affirmed its original
finding that the two Canadian farm maintenance programs were de
facto specific.247 The redetermination, however, was made with virtu-
ally no consideration of the "other factors" which the panel had or-
dered the agency to assess.
In its second decision, the panel majority again rejected the ITA's
conclusions as "not in accordance with the law." 248 The majority
found that the ITA's "mathematical" approach to the specificity anal-
ysis was not consistent with the express directive of the Court of Inter-
national Trade in Roses H1.249 The majority repeated what it had held
in its first decision: satisfying the first criterion of the Department's
Proposed Regulations was not sufficient for an affirmative finding of
de facto specificity.25 0
In rejecting the ITA's conclusions the majority reviewed U.S. ju-
risprudence at length. The majority relied particularly on PPG Indus-
244 Id. at *29-31.
245 Live Swine, supra note 52, Booklet B.13 (May 19, 1992), at 36, 42.
246 Live Swine, supra note 52, Booklet B.13 (May 19, 1992), at 68-70.
247 Live Swine from Canada, Determination on Remand (1TC Investigation No. C-122-404)
(July 20, 1992).
248 Live Swine, supra note 52, Booklet B.13B (Oct. 30, 1992) at 14.
249 Roses Inc. v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 1376, 1380 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1991). In that case it
was held that "Commerce does not perform a proper de facto specificity analysis if it merely
looks at the number of companies that receive benefits under the program; the discretionary
aspects of the program must be considered from the outset." Id at 1380.
250 Live Swine supra note 52, Booklet B.13B (Oct. 30, 1992) at 14.
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tries,251 which stood for the proposition that "if, in its application, the
program results in a subsidy only to a specific enterprise or industry or
specific group of enterprises or industries," the ITA was required to
look at all of the other salient factors in the regulations.2
52
In dismissing the agency's redetermined findings, the majority
concluded:
It appears that Commerce has taken a unidimensional, mathematical ap-
proach to the determination of specificity, despite the Agency's state-
ment in its "Background" to its Proposed Regulations that "the
Department must exercise judgment and balance various factors in ana-
lyzing the facts of the particular case." Commerce also stated that "the
specificity test cannot be reduced to a precise mathematical formula."
Yet Commerce, in our judgment, has resorted to just such a "precise
mathematical formula" in finding that the benefits conveyed under the
Tripartite Program were countervailable simply because they were
,,small". 25 3
This second panel decision triggered a considerable amount of
controversy. One of the U.S. panelists, Murray Belman, wrote a dis-
senting opinion in which he charged that the majority had seriously
breached its mandate.254 Belman asserted that rather than deferring
to the agency's interpretation of the 1988 statute and its Proposed
Regulations, the majority had advanced its own interpretation of U.S.
countervailing duty law.'
On the applicability of the Proposed Regulations, Belman stated
that the ITA's interpretation was reasonable, and therefore in accord-
ance with U.S. law. He argued that it was a "gross mischaracteriza-
tion" to suggest that the ITA's approach was "mechanical" and
"mathematical." '256 Further, the dissenting panelist asserted that U.S.
law did not require an evaluation of the other enumerated factors in
the Department's Proposed Regulations, and that the ITA's reliance
on the "small number of users" criterion satisfied the requirements of
the statute.5 7
251 PPG Industries v. United States, 928 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
252 Id. at 1576 (emphasis added).
253 See Live Swine, supra note 52, Booklet B.13B at 13-14 (citations omitted).
254 Live Swine, supra note 52, Booklet B.13B at 39 (Dissenting Opinion of Murray J.
Belman).
255 Live Swine, supra note 52, Booklet B.13B at 40 (Dissenting Opinion of Murray J.
Belman).
256 Live Swine, supra note 52, Booklet B.13B at 38 (Dissenting Opinion of Murray J.
Belman).
257 Live Swine, supra note 52, Booklet B.13B at 38-39 (Dissenting Opinion of Murray J.
Belman).
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Belman's criticism of the way that the panel utilized the standard
of review is particularly illuminating. His comments are representa-
tive of the way that many U.S. officials have felt about the FTA bina-
tional panel review process:
[T]his panel's decision is breathtaking. The panel shows no recognition
of the limitations imposed by United States law on reviewing bodies con-
fronted with a highly technical, fact-intensive record, and no considera-
tion of the impact of its decision on the binational process. While panel
decisions are not binding on United States courts, they do influence
other binational panels; if given precedential respect by other panels,
this panel's decision would cause a fundamental change in the way
United States countervailing duty law is administered in cases involving
Canadian products. 
258
It was not a surprise, then, when the U.S.T.R. requested an Ex-
traordinary Challenge Committee to review the majority's second de-
cision. The U.S.T.R. invocation averred several violations, including
the serious charge that the panel majority had manifestly exceeded its
powers and authority by disregarding its responsibility to rule on
whether the ITA's interpretation of the "de facto specificity" test was
reasonable under U.S. law.25 9
The Live Swine ECC began its examination of the allegations by
addressing the role of an Extraordinary Challenge Committee under
the FTA. The Committee unanimously stated that the ECC proce-
dure was a "safety valve" available only in exceptional" circumstances
to correct "aberrant" panel behavior.260 While reaffirming that a high
threshold had to be met before a panel decision could be vacated or
remanded, the Committee rejected the Canadian government's argu-
ment that the ECC procedure should be analogous to the restrictive
judicial review of a private commercial arbitration under U.S. law.26'
The Committee next addressed the issue of whether or not the
panel majority had manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or juris-
diction, within the intendment of FTA Article 1904(13)(a)(iii). The
Committee established that a panel would not be found to have com-
258 Live Swine, supra note 52, Booklet B.13B at 40 (Dissenting Opinion of Murray L Belman)
(footnote omitted).
259 Swine ECC, supra note 94, at 1 (citing In the Matter of Live Swine from Canada, No.
ECC-93-1904-01 USA, Office of the United States Trade Representative Request For An Ex-
traordinary Challenge Committee at 7 (Jan. 21, 1993)).
260 Swine ECC, supra note 94, at 3 (citing United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Hear-
ing before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, H. Serial No. 60,100th Cong., 2d Sess. 69,75-
76 (1988) (prepared testimony of M. Jean Anderson, Chief U.S. Negotiator of Binational Panel
Provisions); H.R. Rep. No. 816, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, at 5 and 12 (1988)).
261 Swine ECC, supra note 94, at 4.
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mitted such a violation so long as the panel (i) accurately articulated
the applicable standard of review, and (ii) conscientiously applied that
standard throughout its decision.262
With respect to the first of this two prong test, the Committee was
satisfied that the panel majority had accurately articulated the applica-
ble standard of review. The Committee drew this conclusion after
finding that the panel's decision had properly recognized: (i) the statu-
tory standard of review contained in § 5516A(b)(1)(B) of the Tariff
Act of 1930, as amended; (ii) the "Special Rule' 26 3 which gave the
Department of Commerce broad discretion in administering its "de
facto specificity" analysis; and (iii) the duty placed on reviewing bod-
ies by Chevron2 64 and its progeny to defer to an administering
agency's statutory interpretation of a statute in cases where there was
little statutory guidance.
265
Satisfied that the panel had properly articulated the correct stan-
dard of review, the Committee next examined whether or not the
panel had "conscientiously" applied that standard throughout its deci-
sion. The Committee concluded that the panel may have "erred" in
its finding that the ITA's determination was neither in accordance
with law, nor based on substantial evidence.266 Nevertheless, on bal-
ance, the Committee was not persuaded that the panel had failed to
conscientiously apply the properly articulated standard of review.267
The Live Swine ECC decision affirmed the principle that a very
high threshold had to be met before a panel's decision would be
deemed a manifest breach of jurisdiction. The Committee's refusal to
vacate or remand the panel decision - even though it believed the
panel may have "erred" - confirmed what had been established by the
Pork ECC: Chapter 19 panels were to have significant latitude when
formulating and applying the relevant standard of review.
The Live Swine ECC reaffirmed that a panel's decision would
only be vacated or remanded in the most egregious of circumstances;
however, rather than clearly delineating under what circumstances a
panel would be found to have failed to apply the correct standard of
262 Swine ECC, supra note 94, at 5-6.
263 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B) (1994).
264 Chevron, supra, note 194.
265 Swine ECC, supra note 94, at 5.
266 Swine ECC, supra note 94, at 6.
267 Swine ECC, supra note 94, at 6.
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review, the Committee may have "clouded" matters.268 While the
Committee found that (i) the panel may have "erred" in its applica-
tion of the standard of review, but that (ii) such error was not of suffi-
cient magnitude so as to constitute a "failure to apply the standard of
review conscientiously," the Committee did not explain exactly what
type of error would constitute a "failure to apply the standard of re-
view conscientiously. ' 269 In refusing to establish the point at which an
error in the application of the standard of review became so serious as
to constitute a "failure to apply the appropriate standard," the Com-
mittee failed to clarify the limits of a Chapter 19 panel's jurisdiction
within the meaning of Article 1904(13)(a)(iii).
To summarize, the Live Swine episode illustrates how Chapter 19
panels under the FrA could effectively force U.S. agencies to reverse
portions of their final determination.270 Live Swine, like Pork,
demonstrated that the flexibility present in U.S. "standard of review"
and "de facto specificity" jurisprudence could be interpreted and ap-
plied in such a way so as to force more reasoned agency decision-
making. The careful formulation and employment of a relatively rig-
orous version of the "errors of law" test - in both its initial and subse-
quent opinion - allowed the panel majority to challenge
unsubstantiated ITA conclusions with effectiveness. The Extraordi-
nary Challenge Committee's decision in Live Swine confirmed that a
Chapter 19 panel could engage in such rigorous and activist judicial
review without necessarily exceeding its mandate or jurisdiction.
Panel application of the U.S. standard of review has never been
as controversial as it was in the case of Softwood Lumber. The case
provides another clear illustration of how Chapter 19 panelists utilized
the wide scope which exists in United States jurisprudence in order to
fashion and apply a relatively unyielding standard of review.
4. Softwood Lumber from Canada
Before its resolution, this conflict had been one of the most long-
standing and acrimonious disputes to plague the Canada-United
268 Jordan B. Goldstein, Dispute Resolution Under Chapter 19 of the United States- Canada
Free-Trade AgreemenL" Did the Parties Get What They Bargained For? 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 275,
299 (1995).
269 Id.
270 The panel's finding that Tripartite and FISI had provided benefits which were "non-
countervailable" led to a reduction in the original duty on sows and boars by 14.89%, and on all
other live swine by 88.64%. The remainder of the duties on these items was maintained because
the panel affirmed the IrA's finding that other Canadian governmental programs had conferred
countervailable benefits on Canadian producers of live swine.
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States commercial relationship. Indeed, one of the primary catalysts
behind the Canadian desire to consummate the FTA was a need to
eliminate United States CVD actions against Canadian softwood lum-
ber exports. The conflict, which was recently examined by an Ex-
traordinary Challenge Committee, had continued unabated for over
eleven years.
A complete examination of the history leading to the recent
Chapter 19 case is beyond the scope of this Study, as is an enumera-
tion and evaluation of all of the issues in this case.271 Our examina-
tion will be confined to an analysis of how the panel reviewed the
ITA's finding that Canadian "stumpage programs" were "de facto
specific. '272 The way that the panel disposed of this issue is illustra-
tive of the manner in which it resolved the other major issues in
review.
In its final determination, the ITA found that the Canadian gov-
ernment had set stumpage fees - i.e., the price charged to remove a
tree - at artificially low levels.273 The agency reasoned that as a result,
a countervailable benefit had been conferred on beneficiaries of the
Canadian federal program, which group included Canadian producers
of softwood lumber.
As a result of these findings, the ITA calculated that Canadian
exports of softwood lumber were being unfairly subsidized at a rate of
6.51%.274 Countervailing duties were applied accordingly. Canadian
exporters appealed to a Chapter 19 panel.
In determining that Canadian softwood lumber exporters were
part of a "specific industry" that had benefited from preferential
stumpage prices, the ITA based the crux of its determination on one
evidentiary finding: that the number of users of Canadian stumpage
was limited and finite.275 Before the Softwood Lumber binational
panel, the ITA argued that once it found that a subsidy had been con-
ferred upon a "limited number of users," it was not required under
United States law to examine the other enumerated factors in its Pro-
posed Regulations.276 In the alternative, the ITA contended that it
271 For a thorough history of the Softwood Lumber dispute, See Recent Developments in
United States - Canada Softwood Lumber, 25 LAW & Por!Y INt'L Bus. 1187-1203 (1994).
272 Again, to apply a CVD, the "specificity" test requires that there must exist: (i) a subsidy;
and (ii) a specific industry which benefits from that subsidy. Our analysis will concentrate on
whether the benefits of Canadian stumpage programs were bestowed on a "specific industry."
273 Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,570 (1992).
274 Id.
275 Id. at 22583.
276 Response of the Investigating Authority, January 6, 1993, IV.C.III.
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had "considered" all of the enumerated criteria, but had decided that
only one - the limited number of users - was required to support an
affirmative finding of specificity.2 77
Before examining whether the ITA had administered its Pro-
posed Regulations reasonably, the binational panel undertook an-
other thorough analysis of the United States standard of review. The
panel carefully articulated the "substantial evidence" and "errors of
law" tests, and acknowledged that it could not depart from those for-
mulations in a "clandestine" attempt to change United States law.278
The panel then put the ITA on notice by stating that it would take a
proactive role in its capacity as a reviewing body:
While this panel is obligated to show deference to the agency's expertise,
we are entitled to ensure that the agency's interpretation of the statute is
reasonable.279
When the panel rigorously reviewed the ITA final determination
- in a way that by now had become routine under the FTA - it found
difficulties with the agency's reasoning. As in Live Swine, the Soft-
wood Lumber panel flatly rejected that an affirmative finding of
"specificity" could be grounded on consideration of only one of the
four factors in the Department of Commerce's Proposed Regula-
tions.28 0 The panel found that: (i) the evidence provided by the ITA
concerning "number of users" was not dispositive of the issue at hand;
and (ii) there existed evidence on the record regarding factors such as
the lack of "dominant" or "disproportionate" use of stumpage by the
Canadian softwood lumber industry that could reasonably have in-
formed the ITA's "specificity" analysis. 8 ' The panel reasoned that
had the ITA considered these other factors, the agency may well have
found that Canadian stumpage programs failed the "specificity"
test.8 2
Of particular importance for this review is the way by which the
panel justified its rejection of the ITA methodology. The panel based
its repudiation of the ITA findings on solid jurisprudential support,
citing the most recent formulation of the "specifity test," PPG IV, and
concluding:
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has stated in PPG IV that
Commerce must consider all of the factors in the Proposed Regulations
277 Softwood Lumber Products, supra note 273, at 22583.
278 Softwood Lumber, supra note 20, Booklet B.20A (May 6, 1993) at 19.
279 Softwood Lumber, supra note 20, Booklet B.20A (May 6, 1993) at 29 (emphasis added).
280 Softwood Lumber, supra note 20, Booklet B.20A (May 6, 1993) at 31-32.
281 Softwood Lumber, supra note 20, Booklet B.20A (May 6, 1993) at 31-32.
282 Softwood Lumber, supra note 20, Booklet B.20A (May 6, 1993) at 31-32.
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"in light of the evidence in the record in determining the specificity in a
given case." Nowhere in either the Preliminary Determination nor the
Final Determination is there a reference to any record evidence regard-
ing government action, disproportionate use, or government
discretion.
28 3
In its redetermination on remand, the ITA found that Canadian
stumpage users constituted one large group of two or three smaller
industries and that this was "too few" to justify a finding of "non-
specificity. '"28 1 In addition, the agency provided data showing that
these industries were disproportionate users of stumpage.28 5
Before addressing the ITA's redetermination, the panel major-
ity's second decision once again canvassed the United States standard
of review. The recent case of Daewoo Electronics Co. Ltd. v. U.S.8 6
had reviewed in detail the standard applicable to judicial review of
U.S. agency decisions. In that case, which was concluded in the time
period between the panel's initial and second opinions, Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit found that reviewing agencies were re-
quired to give deference to the ITA's choice of analytical and
empirical methodology. This new judicial authority appeared to but-
tress the ITA's argument that the panel was obliged under United
States law to defer to the agency's "reasonable" findings.2
In its detailed discussion of the standard of review, the majority
concluded that the "general" statements in Daewoo articulating "def-
erence" did not have the effect of overturning the "specific" pro-
nouncements of United States courts in cases such as PPG IV.28 8 The
majority asserted that the ITA was still legally obliged to (i) consider
all four of its enumerated criteria in the "Proposed Regulations;" and
(ii) apply the "specificity" test in a reasonable and rational manner.8 9
The majority completed its discussion of the standard of review
by finding that Daewoo did not create a "new" or "expanded" stan-
dard of deference and that, as a result, it would apply the same type of
careful review as that applied in the first panel opinion:
283 Softwood Lumber, supra note 20, Booklet B.20A (May 6, 1993) at 32 (citing PPG Indus-
tries v. United States, 978 F. 2d 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1992)(hereinafter "PPG IV").
284 Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Determination Pursuant
to Binational Panel Remand (hereinafter "Determination on Remand"), at 19,25 (Sept. 17,1993)
as cited in Softwood Lumber, supra note 20, Booklet B.20B (Dec. 17,1993) at 14-15 notes 76-77.
285 Determination on Remand, supra note 284 at 41.
286 6 F.3d 1511 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (hereinafter "Daewoo").
287 Ld. Daewoo was a case where the ITA's interpretation of U.S. antidumping law, as con-
tamined in 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677a(d)(1)(c), was in dispute.
288 Softwood Lumber, supra note 20, Booklet B.20B (Dec. 17, 1993) at 14.
289 Softwood Lumber, supra note 20, Booklet B.20B (Dec. 17, 1993) at 14.
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Although review under the substantial evidence standard by definition is
limited, application of the standard does not result in the wholesale abdi-
cation of the Panel's authority to conduct a meaningful review of the
Commission's determination. Indeed a contrary conclusion would result
in the evisceration of the purpose for reviewing agency determinations,
rendering the appeal process superfluous. The deference to be afforded
an agency's findings and conclusions is therefore not unbounded. 90
By employing this standard, the majority flatly rejected the ITA's
finding that the number of users of stumpage was "too few" to be
considered "non-specific. '291 The majority found the ITA's method-
ology to be "mechanical and mathematical," and therefore in contra-
vention of both United States law and the agency's established
practice. 2
In finding that the ITA had not adequately evaluated each of the
four factors in its "Proposed Regulations," the majority's tone was no-
tably critical:
The complete lack of reasoned analysis regarding whether or not the
number of industries using stumpage is too few, and the mechanical,
mathematical way in which Commerce decided that the users of stump-
age are too few to be non-specific, is contrary to law and legal prece-
dent... [T]he analysis of dominant or disproportionate use.., is either
irrelevant or perverse. The use of the statistics relating to whether saw-
mills account for a dominant or disproportionate share of stumpage is
similarly mechanistic, conclusory, or, in some cases, misleading... Since
Commerce has been unable to provide a rational legal basis for a finding
that the provincial stumpage programs are specific and in light of the
efficiency with which the Panel Review is intended to resolve these dis-
putes, we therefore remand this issue to Commerce for a determination
that the provincial stumpage programs are not provided to a specific
enterprise.. 293
The majority's decision on the issue of 'stumpage programs' was
split along national lines. Where the Canadian majority decided that
Daewoo did not grant the ITA unbounded deference to create its own
methodology, the dissent, comprised of the two American panelists,
asserted that the majority had misconceived and misapplied the ap-
propriate standard of review 2 94 The dissent alleged that the majority
had failed to provide the amount of deference required by Daewoo,
which case had reinforced the "posture of deference" that United
290 Softwood Lumber, supra note 20, Booklet B.20B (Dec. 17, 1993) at 11 (quoting Lumber-
Injury, supra note 35, Booklet B.21A (July 26, 1993) at 9).
291 Softwood Lumber, supra note 20, Booklet B.20B (Dec. 17, 1993) at 25.
292 Softwood Lumber, supra note 20, Booklet B.20B, (Dec. 17, 1993) at 31.
293 Softwood Lumber, supra note 20, Booklet B.20B (Dec. 17, 1993) at 31-32 (emphasis
added).
294 Softwood Lumber, supra note 20, Booklet B.20B (Dec. 17, 1993) at 72-78.
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States administrative law accords to agency determinations.295 In a
particularly charged opinion, the dissent found that the panel was en-
gaged more in statutory and regulatory amendment than judicial re-
view, and that this action clearly violated the requirements of United
States law. 96
Once again the United States requested the formation of an Ex-
traordinary Challenge Committee. Its request alleged that the bina-
tional panel had manifestly exceeded its powers, authority and
jurisdiction by ignoring the United States standard of review. The
U.S.T.R. concluded that this breach of duty threatened the very integ-
rity of the binational panel process.
The majority of the ECC, consisting of retired Canadian judges,
upheld the disputed majority decision. As in the Pork Extraordinary
Challenge, the Committee in Softwood Lumber inferred that the
panel must be flexible when determining what constitutes "substantial
evidence. 297 The ECC majority recognized further that while the
panel majority and dissent had differed in their views concerning the
applicable substantive law, the panel majority nevertheless had not
failed to conscientiously apply the standard of review required under
United States law. 98
The dissenting opinion, written by Retired United States Circuit
Judge Malcolm Wilkey, manifested the amount of discontent which
had been created in certain U.S. circles following episodes such as
Pork, Live Swine and, now, Softwood Lumber. The dissenting judge
castigated the panel majority for flagrantly violating the "standard of
review" requirement and concluded that this blatant breach of duty
threatened the integrity of the binational panel process.z9
On the matter of Daewoo, Judge Wilkey concluded that that case
simply re-affirmed that United States administering agencies were to
enjoy discretion when choosing and applying methodology. 00 He
held that when there existed a "gap" in a statute with respect to meth-
odology, Congress was implicitly authorizing the administering agency
- and not a reviewing body - to fill it accordingly.30' On this failure to
apply the correct United States standard of review, the dissenting
judge concluded:
295 Softwood Lumber, supra note 20, Booklet B.20B (Dec. 17, 1993) at 77.
296 Softwood Lumber, supra note 20, Booklet B.20B (Dec. 17, 1993) at 87.
297 Softwood Lumber ECC, supra note 102, at 18 (Opinion of Hart, J.)
298 Softwood Lumber ECC, supra note 102, at 25 (Opinion of Hart, J.).
299 Softwood Lumber ECC, supra note 102, at 81-91 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
300 Softwood Lumber ECC, supra note 102, at 73-76 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
301 Softwood Lumber ECC, supra note 102, at 76 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
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In summary, I believe that this Binational Panel Majority opinion may
violate more principles of appellate review of agency action than any
opinion by a reviewing body which I have ever read.' °2
Judge Wilkey's dissent went considerably beyond examining the
Softwood Lumber majority decision: the charges amount to an indict-
ment of the entire Chapter 19 process. His opinion concluded that the
Chapter 19 system - at both the panel and ECC level - had failed.3 "3
The vituperative tone of Judge Wilkey's comments suggest that it was
inevitable from the outset that substitution of binational panel review
for traditional judicial review would violate established precepts of
United States administrative law:
The record shows that five (or in this case three) distinguished "experts"
have shown no deference whatsoever to the "experts" in the ITA of the
Commerce Department.
Psychologically, why should they be expected to show the deference
to administrative agency action which is required as a fundamental tenet
of United States judicial review of agency action? The panel members
are experts; they know better than the lowly paid "experts" over in the
Commerce Department, and they have felt inclined to say so. Repeat-
edly, most vividly in this particular case, they seem to have substituted
their judgment for that of the agency. They have not hesitated to say
that the agency was wrong on its methodology, wrong in the choice of
alternate economic analyses, wrong in its conclusions, and that the Panel
of five experts knows far better how to do it. All of this of course is
directly contrary to long-standing United States law concepts of review
of agency action.
3 04
The ECC's approval of the panel majority's decision resulted in
the removal of the entire 6.51% CVD on Canadian exports of Soft-
wood Lumber to the United States.305 The victory was the largest yet
for Canadian exporters under the FTA.
5. Cases Brought Against U.S. Agencies - Conclusions
Pork, Live Swine and Softwood Lumber each showed that the ad-
vent of FTA Chapter 19 binational panel review has advanced the in-
terests of Canadian exporters. Binational panels in those cases used
the "substantial evidence" test and "errors of law" requirement to ef-
fectively force reversal of unsubstantiated U.S. agency conclusions
and to ensure that those agencies were consistent in their choice and
application of methodology. In the domain of trade remedy law,
302 Softwood Lumber ECC, supra note 102, at 80 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
303 Softwood Lumber ECC, supra note 102, at 91 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
304 Softwood Lumber ECC, supra note 102, at 92 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
305 And Refund of those duties.
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where the calculation of dumping and subsidy margins is intrinsically
tied to the choice of methodology employed, promoting methodologi-
cal consistency has furthered the pro-competitive objective of the
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement.
Although it is clear that exporters, Canadian more than Ameri-
can, tangibly benefited from Chapter 19 binational panel review, this
fact in and of itself is not sufficient to characterize the FTA Chapter
19 experience as a "success." Before drawing such a conclusion, one
should be satisfied that binational panels have not achieved the FTA's
objective of guaranteeing the impartial application of trade remedy
laws at the expense of another important FTA express objective,
namely, ensuring that panelists apply the same standard of review and
general legal principles that would otherwise be applied by courts of
the importing party.
Judge Wilkey's dissent in Softwood Lumber asserted that Chapter
19 binational panels have, at times, exceeded their jurisdiction by ap-
plying an "incorrect" standard of review. Recently, in written testi-
mony before the U.S. House of Representatives Ways and Means
Committee Subcommittee on Trade,30 6 Judge Wilkey elaborated on
these conclusions. He contended that the FTA Chapter 19 system had
"failed" because panelists: (i) lack accountability; (ii) are too prone to
conflicts of interest; (iii) cannot avoid the temptation to "redo" the
work of the administering agencies; and (iv) have no experience with
judicial review.30 7 On this last point, Judge Wilkey wrote:
The ad hoc panels have no feeling for the unique standards of judicial
review, which in many respects is a unique American institution. There
is no sense of deference to the expertise of the administrative agency,
which the CIT does have. More damaging to the fairness of the system,
foreigners, even Canadians, lack an essential knowledge of United States
law, both substantive and procedural, or perhaps are unwilling to apply
it against the traditions of their own law.308
Are these criticisms accurate? Have binational panelists, particu-
larly the Canadians, been unable to accord the proper level of defer-
ence required under United States law? Has this lack of familiarity
with the requirements of United States judicial review caused the
306 Should the NAFTA Chapter 19 Dispute Settlement Mechanism of Ad Hoc Panels Be Con-
tinued or Extended to Other Countries: Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on
Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, June 21, 1995 (written testimony of Malcolm
R. Wilkey, retired United States Circuit Judge), available in 1995 WL 371096 (F.D.C.H.).
307 Id. at *3.
308 Id. at *34.
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Chapter 19 system to fail in its express objective? These crticisms ap-
pear misplaced for three reasons.
First, allegations that binational panels have failed to show the
proper level of deference to U.S. agencies because they have applied
the "wrong" standard of review may be somewhat misguided. To sug-
gest that a panel has applied an "incorrect" standard of review implies
that there exists a "correct" standard. As has been shown throughout
this Study, besides the limited guidance provided by statute, i.e., by
the "substantial evidence" and "errors of law" tests, the applicable
standard of review is not a clearly ascertainable instrument which can
be identified and applied with ease. Instead, it is composed of a
number of different elements including conflicting judicial proposi-
tions. Determining what constitutes the applicable standard of review
therefore involves subjective judgment and discretion on the part of
reviewing courts or panels,3 9 and is often the source of considerable
disagreement between reasonable, informed individuals. In short,
there rarely exists a single "correct" standard of review and, thus, it is
difficult to argue that panels have applied the "incorrect" standard.
When those who criticize Chapter 19's performance under the
FTA argue that panelists have applied the wrong standard of review,
what they seem to be implying is that they oppose the manner by
which Chapter 19 panels have applied the United States standard of
review. It is true that binational panels, after having enunciated the
proper standard of review, applied that standard rigorously and at
times unrelentingly to United States agency final determinations. It is
also true that this binational experiment, i.e., the conduct of judicial
review with non-judges and foreign citizens, will naturally cause con-
cern for those who question the qualification of these "surrogate"
judges. Nevertheless, the fact that the United States and Canada de-
veloped this binational system to begin with speaks to their mutual
purpose to change the manner by which reviewing bodies would con-
duct the review of administrative agency final determinations. This
fact cannot be ignored when assessing the performance of the FTA
Chapter 19 system.
Second, it has been suggested that Chapter 19 panelists lack an
essential understanding of U.S. procedural and substantive law. This
and other studies have found that panelists have proven adept at in-
terpreting and applying complex trade remedy laws as well as the re-
quirements of U.S. and Canadian administrative law during review of
309 GAO Study, supra note 15, at 35.
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final determinations. Nonetheless, it is recognized that there is a sub-
jective element to determining what constitutes United States "law"
on any given matter and that, as a result, it is possible to conclude that
Chapter 19 panelists have failed to properly interpret procedural and
substantive U.S. law.
What is indisputable is that there has been a general consensus
among commentators that FTA Chapter 19 panel decisions have been
of high quality:
Panel decisions which have been rendered so far have been quite lengthy
and detailed. Each decision has addressed a number of issues. Panels
have given detailed attention to every issue brought before them. They
have taken their role very seriously, and have produced carefully
thought-out decisions.
310
Finally, it is far from clear that Chapter 19 panelists have deliv-
ered decisions that uniformly diverge from the opinions which would
have been rendered by the CIT had these binational panel cases been
brought before that court. As was outlined above, a few cases chal-
lenging United States agency determinations have caused considera-
ble controversy. Notwithstanding these cases, FTA Chapter 19 panels
for the most part produced uncontroversial decisions and outcomes
which could well have fallen within the range of opinions rendered by
the CIT. If the CIT has produced a "spectrum" of decisions in which
judicial review has ranged from "deferential" to "rigorous," the FTA
Chapter 19 cases would fall within this range, albeit at the "rigorous"
end of that spectrum.
II. CHAPTER 19 DispuTE SETmLEMENT UNDER NAFTA
This study has asserted that Canadian exporters asymmetrically
benefited from the application of the FrA's Chapter 19 process. To
summarize, the factors which contributed to the disparity of results
under the FTA were:
i) A relatively flexible United States "standard of review" which, when
applied by panelists, could be used to effectively overturn agency
determinations;
ii) The existence of a "privative" clause which, when combined with
Canada's ingrained judicial predisposition toward "deference," pro-
tected the CITT from exacting panel review;
iii) Panel ability to invoke a rule of "finality" which effectively limited
further opportunity for U.S. domestic agencies to re-formulate and sup-
port their conclusions;
310 See Robichaud and Steger, supra note 13, at 17. These conclusions have been confirmed
by the GAO in its recent study. See GAO Study, supra note 15, at 65.
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iv) A high threshold which had to be surmounted if panel decisions
were to be successfully challenged before Extraordinary Challenge
Committees;
v) The use of international trade lawyers and economists as panelists;
and
vi) A consistent effort on the part of panelists reviewing United States
agency final determinations to formulate and apply an unyielding stan-
dard of review, both in initial panel opinions and in subsequent
judgments.
Is it possible that Canadian exporters will continue to enjoy simi-
lar levels of success under NAFTA? While NAFTA Chapter 19
largely incorporates the FTA's rules and procedures, a number of
amendments to the FTA system have been made that could materially
change the way that the Chapter 19 system operates.
A. NAFTA and Chapter 19
NAFTA Chapter 19 largely duplicates, on a trilateral basis, proce-
dures that were in effect between the United States and Canada under
the FTA. It provides for binding binational panel review of final AD,
CVD and material injury determinations involving goods of NAFTA
countries,31' and for binational panel review of changes to existing
anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws of the parties.312
One significant addition to the Chapter 19 system is Article 1905.
This provision establishes a "special committee" review process which
is intended to "safeguard" the trilateral panel system. The special
committee process provides recourse in the event that the application
of a party's domestic law prevents the establishment of a panel, pre-
cludes the panel from rendering a final decision, interferes with the
implementation of a panel decision, or does not provide opportunity
for effective and meaningful review of a final determination by a
NAFTA panel or national court.
313
The first step under the safeguard mechanism is for the NAFTA
countries to consult on the matter in dispute. If the two governments
involved cannot resolve the matter through consultations, the com-
plaining NAFTA country has recourse to a special committee to con-
sider the allegation.314 If the committee makes an affirmative finding,
the parties must enter into further consultations. If such consultations
fail to resolve the matter, the complaining party may suspend the op-
311 NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1904.
312 NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1903.
313 NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1905(1).
314 NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1905(2)-(4).
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eration of the binational panel review system under Article 1904 or
withdraw "other benefits" under NAFTA.315 If the complaining party
suspends Article 1904 or NAFTA benefits, the party complained
against may reciprocally suspend the operation of Article 1904 and
may also reconvene the special committee to determine whether the
suspension of benefits was "excessive" or whether the problem com-
plained of has been corrected.316
The safeguard system offers one major advantage over the FTA.
Under the FTA the only recourse available to the United States or
Canada if they were concerned with the other country's effective im-
plementation of Chapter 19 was abrogation of the entire Agree-
ment.317 NAFTA Article 1905 permits a party to suspend operation of
Article 1904 with respect to a government that has failed to meet its
Chapter 19 obligations.318 Article 1905 thus provides an "effective
and balanced method for ensuring that Chapter 19 continues to oper-
ate as the NAFTA countries intended, without jeopardizing the entire
NAFTA. '3 19
Notwithstanding this useful addition, NAFTA has altered the
FTA Chapter 19 system in two other respects which have the potential
to dilute some of the positive aspects of the FTA Chapter 19 system.
First, a major factor which contributed to the efficacy of Chapter
19 decision-making was the utilization of international trade lawyers
and economists as panelists. FTA panelists produced decisions which
were well reasoned, thoroughly considered, and which reflected the
panelists' knowledge of the complexities of trade remedy laws. While
attentive to matters of jurisdiction, panelists refused to yield to unsup-
ported agency findings.
The level of international trade law expertise that was present on
FTA Chapter 19 panels could be reduced under NAFTA due to an
alteration made to the provisions governing the establishment of
Chapter 19 panels. Annex 1901.2 has been amended under NAFTA
to the effect that the roster of panelists maintained by each of the
contracting parties "shall include judges or former judges to the fullest
extent possible."
315 NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1905(8).
316 NAFTA, supra note 12, art. 1905(10).
317 The North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act Statement of Administra-
tive Action, 1 N.A. Free Trade Agreements: Treaties (Oceana), Booklet 8 (Feb. 1994) at 181
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It is interesting to note how Canada and the United States have
differed in their interpretation of this amendment. Canada, eager to
downplay the significance of this change, asserted in its Statement on
Implementation320 that it intended to continue staffing its Chapter 19
roster with lawyers, non-lawyers and sitting or retired judges. 321 The
Canadian government emphasized that expertise in the area of inter-
national trade will continue to play a central role in its selection of
Chapter 19 panelists.
By contrast, the United States, in its Statement of Administrative
Action, accentuated the importance of this alteration. Instead of con-
centrating on the importance of choosing individuals with expertise in
international trade, the United States asserted that there were "sev-
eral advantages" to having judges and former judges serve as Chapter
19 panelists:
.. the participation of panelists with judicial experience would help to
ensure that, in accordance with the requirement of Article 1904, panels
review determinations of the administering authorities precisely as
would a court of the importing country by applying exclusively that
country's AD and CVD law and its standard of review. In addition, the
involvement of judges in the process would diminish the possibility that
panels and courts will develop distinct bodies of U.S. law.3
If the U.S. interpretation of this amendment is eventually ac-
cepted and followed by the other NAFTA parties, the Chapter 19 sys-
tem could revert toward the pre-FTA system of traditional judicial
review of final determinations. Judges, by training, are more attentive
to questions of jurisdiction, and are less likely to challenge agency de-
terminations with the same degree of rigor as have FTA panelists.
This would be especially true if the judges appointed by the parties to
serve as Chapter 19 panelists had no prior experience with trade rem-
edy law. In short, a decrease in the utilization of non-judges as panel-
ists and a concomitant increase in the use of judges and former judges
could lead to a more deferential type of Chapter 19 panel review.
A second significant alteration to the FTA Chapter 19 system
concerns amendment of the Extraordinary Challenge Committee pro-
cedures. Under the FTA, an Extraordinary Challenge Committee's
responsibilities ended with ensuring that a panel articulated and ap-
plied the correct standard of review. Under NAFTA, an Extraordi-
320 North American Free Trade Agreement Canadian Statement on Implementation, 1 N.A.
Free Trade Agreements: Treaties (Oceana) Booklet 12A, Issued October 1994 (hereinafter "Ca-
nadian Statement on Implementation").
321 Id. at 115.
322 U.S. Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 317, at 178 (emphasis added).
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nary Challenge Committee's mandate has been broadened in two
important respects.
First, an Extraordinary Challenge Committee under NAFTA is
explicitly authorized to examine a panel's analysis of substantive law
and underlying facts. 3 Again, Canada and the United States have
offered disparate interpretations of this amendment. Where the Ca-
nadian government has asserted that this amendment only makes "ex-
plicit" what was already "implicit" under the FTA,324 the United
States sees this expansion as an "important change. ' '32 When com-
bined with the fact that Extraordinary Challenge Committees now are
entitled to 90 days to undertake their review,32 6 as opposed to 30 days
under the FTA, it becomes evident that the Extraordinary Challenge
Committee procedures have been modified in order to resemble those
applicable to appellate courts.
Apart from procedural changes made to the ECC process, there
has been another, more important, and potentially problematic, alter-
ation to the FTA system. During the FTA years, panel decisions were
effectively non-reviewable except under a narrow list of unusual cir-
cumstances which included gross misconduct, bias, breach of funda-
mental procedures, or action that 'manifestly' exceeded a panel's
mandate.3 27 The decisions of the three Extraordinary Challenge
Committees confirmed the notion that panels were to have considera-
ble latitude when examining final determinations.
Under NAFTA Article 1904(13)('ii), an Extraordinary Challenge
Committee can now vacate or remand a panel opinion if it finds that
the panel "failed to apply the appropriate standard of review." Yet
again, the two countries have offered different interpretations of this
amendment. Where Canada has stated that this alteration "does not
expand the scope of an extraordinary challenge proceeding from what
had been negotiated under the FTA,"32 the United States considers
this change to be "significant."329
Merely articulating and faithfully applying the United States stan-
dard of review may no longer be sufficient to immunize a panel deci-
sion from successful extraordinary challenge. Given the fact that
there has been, at times, considerable disagreement between panelists
323 NAFTA, supra note 12, Annex 1904.13.
324 Canadian Statement on Implementation, supra note 320, at 115.
325 U.S. Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 317, at 179.
326 NAFTA, supra note 12, Annex 1904.13.
327 FTA, supra note 1, Annex 1904.13.
328 Canadian Statement on Implementation, supra note 320, at 115.
329 U.S. Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 317, at 178.
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as to what constitutes the appropriate "standard of review," judges on
Extraordinary Challenge Committees may now be invited to examine
how a binational panel both articulated and applied the relevant stan-
dard. While the three ECC decisions under the FTA did not address
the specific issue of defining and applying the applicable standard of
review, it is possible that future Committees could become much more
involved with the substantive factual and legal issues in dispute.
Whether or not these alterations to the FTA Chapter 19 system
will in practice significantly change the way that Chapter 19 system
operates under NAFTA remains to be seen. To date, the NAFTA
Chapter 19 system appears to have functioned in much the same way
as it had under the FTA. Nevertheless, since there has as yet been no
Extraordinary Challenge Committee invoked under Chapter 19 of the
NAFTA, it may be premature to assess the overall effects of these
alterations.
What is clear at the present time is that the changes to the Chap-
ter 19 framework outlined above have the potential to move the pro-
cess away from a surrogate hybrid system of "expert" review and
more towards the traditional mode of judicial review which Chapter
19 was originally designed to replace. To the extent that there is a
clear divergence between the U.S. and Canada as to the significance
of these amendments to the Chapter 19 system, the potential for con-
flict has increased.
B. The Canadian Standard of Review
In addition to the direct changes made by NAFIA to the Chapter
19 system, an important amendment has also been made to the Cana-
dian standard of review. As was shown earlier in this study, the pres-
ence of a "privative" clause, when combined with the ingrained
judicial deference that exists in Canada to specialized administrative
agencies, has made it extremely difficult for U.S. exporters to secure
reversal of CIJT final determinations.
Effective as of January 1, 1994, the Special Import Measures Act
was amended to implement certain of Canada's obligations under
Chapter 19 of the NAFTA. Among these changes, the CITT's "priva-
tive clause" was repealed.330
As a result of this amendment, one might presume that NAFTA
Chapter 19 panels would now be able to review alleged CITT errors
of law by way of the "reasonableness" standard instead of the highly
330 See discussion, supra, note 119.
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deferential "patently unreasonable." The Supreme Court of Canada,
however, recently dispelled any notion that the absence of a privative
clause will subject expert agencies such as the CIT to more unyield-
ing judicial review.
The court in Pezim331 recently considered the standard of review
applicable to "errors of law" when an expert agency is not "protected"
by way of a privative clause. Justice Iacobucci made the following
observation:
[E]ven where there is no privative clause and where there is a statutory
right of appeal, the concept of the specialization of duties requires that
deference be shown to decisions of specialized tribunals on matters
which fall squarely within the tribunal's expertise.332
When examining how much judicial deference has to be accorded
to an expert tribunal, the Justice concluded that courts were required
to show "considerable deference" in cases where the agency was not
"protected" by a privative clause.33
Two recent NAFTA Chapter 19 panels reviewing CITT final de-
terminations applied Pezim.334 Both panels confirmed that reviewing
bodies must, in the absence of a "privative clause," give "considerable
deference" to the expert agency when examining alleged errors of law.
How much deference must be granted by a reviewing body under
the "considerable deference" standard? The Chapter 19 panel in
Baler Twine explored this issue:
In the current case, while the Tribunal's decision is not protected by a
privative clause, there is no right of appeal from its decisions. The only
right that arises is one of judicial review. There is no reason, in logic or
in law, to conclude that it is entitled to anything less that "considerable
deference." While that deference does not extend to the point of patent
unreasonability, it resides close to that end of the spectrum of
deference.33
5
NAFTA Chapter 19 panels will be required to employ the "con-
siderable deference" approach outlined in Pezim when reviewing al-
leged errors of law. While this test may provide reviewing bodies with
somewhat more latitude than the "patently unreasonable" test, it re-
331 Pezim, supra note 123, at 590.
332 Pezim, supra note 123, at 591.
333 Pezim, supra note 123, at 598-599.
334 See In the Matter of Certain Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sheet Products Originating in or
Exported from the United States of America, (Injury), CDA-94-1904-04 1995 WL 416312
(N.A.F.T.A. Binat. Panel), at *6 (July 10, 1995); In the Matter of Synthetic Baler Twine with A
Knot Strength of 200 Lbs or less Originating in or Exported from the United States of America,
No. CDA-94-1904-02, (April 10,1995) 2 N.Am. Free Trade Agreements: Disp. Settlement (Oce-
ana), Booklet B.36 at 6, (hereinafter "Baler Twine").
335 Baler Twine, supra note 334, at 11.
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mains a highly deferential standard. As a result, even though the priv-
ative clause has been repealed, U.S. exporters should not expect this
development to translate directly into more rigorous binational panel
review of alleged CITr agency errors of law.
C. The Limits of Chapter 19
There are a number of limitations to the Chapter 19 process
which have become increasingly apparent in recent months. First,
changes made to the Chapter 19 system under NAFTA could cause
the system to lose its distinctiveness as a hybrid model of adjudication
and arbitration. If such a development materializes, it is possible that
this binational panel system will come to resemble traditional domes-
tic judicial review.
Second, the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Pezim
has underscored the fact that the Canadian standard of review, appli-
cable to both Revenue Canada and the CITr, is highly deferential.
U.S. exporters under NAFTA, therefore, should not expect the
NAFTA Chapter 19 system to provide them with substantial relief
from injurious Canadian agency decisions.
A third limitation concerns the NAFTA Chapter 19 system's po-
tential to create a body of jurisprudence which diverges from that
which has been and will continue to be created by domestic courts
with respect to non-NAFTA exporters. A recent study has concluded
that FTA Chapter 19 panels made reference to other Chapter 19 panel
opinions.336 The study, however, could not conclusively find that a
separate jurisprudence was emerging because reference to Chapter 19
decisions was often made for the purpose of familiarizing the reader
with the history of the dispute, or illustrating the functioning of the
panel process.3
37
Even if one finds that no considerable jurisprudence has yet
emerged from the FTA Chapter 19 cases, it will become increasingly
difficult in coming years to avoid the creation of such a divergent body
of law as the number of decided Chapter 19 cases increases.
A fourth limitation in the NAFTA Chapter 19 system is that this
dispute resolution mechanism cannot guarantee secure market access
for NAFrA exporters. If a final AD/CVD or material injury determi-
nation is made by one NAFrA party concerning goods of another
NAFrA party, the Chapter 19 system can provide an effective remedy
336 GAO Study, supra note 15, at 81-83.
337 GAO Study, supra note 15, at 83.
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toward ensuring that review of that determination is impartial. Even
if an exporter succeeds, however, in having a duty level removed fol-
lowing Chapter 19 panel review, as was the case in Softwood Lumber,
the Chapter 19 system cannot preclude the initiation of another trade
remedy action against the same exporter(s) in the future. The Chap-
ter 19 system should therefore be seen as a limited remedy providing,
at best, temporary relief from injurious trade remedy law actions.338
A fifth limitation built into the NAFTA Chapter 19 system is that
this mechanism only provides a way of reducing or eliminating duties
resulting from improperly applied trade remedy laws. To the extent
that the application of a duty results from the proper application of
domestic trade remedy law, Chapter 19 panels must uphold contested
final determinations.
In Part I of this study it was shown that U.S. exporters have en-
joyed little if any success in securing reversal of duty levels. Canadian
exporters, on the other hand, have reduced duties by about 28% by
appealing final determinations to Chapter 19 binational panels. While
these results are undoubtedly positive from the perspective of Cana-
dian exporters, the fact remains that 72% of contested duties are be-
ing "affirmed" following Chapter 19 review. Given the fact that
Chapter 19 litigation is expensive, that the process can become pro-
tracted and that the scope for success is limited, petitioners in the fu-
ture may find that the costs of the Chapter 19 procedure outweigh the
expected reduction in duty levels. This would be especially the case
for smaller exporters who do not have the resources to finance pro-
tracted review of final determinations.
The most serious problem facing exporters is that the Chapter 19
system, by its nature, is limited in the type of relief that it can furnish.
Panels to date have done their best to ensure that national AD/CVD
law has been correctly applied. In this respect, the FTA Chapter 19
system has provided an effective "check" on administered protection.
What the Chapter 19 experience has also shown, however, is that the
"gravamen" of these disputes lies with the underlying trade laws
themselves.339
338 As an example, even though Canadian exporters succeeded in the latest round in Soft-
wood Lumber, there is recent evidence to suggest that the U.S. softwood lumber industry is
preparing to initiate a new CVD case against Canadian exporters. See Schreiner, supra note 22,
at 3.
339 See Michael Reisman and Mark Wiedman, Contextual Imperatives of Dispute Resolution
Mechanisms: Some Hypotheses and Their Applications in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA, . of
Glo. Tr. (forthcoming).
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NAFTA Chapter 19 cannot be expected to remedy the shortcom-
ings in trade remedy regimes which policy makers have not had the
will to address. Americans, Canadians and Mexicans, therefore,
should remain attentive to the structural limitations of the current
Chapter 19 system, and should take bold steps to eliminate deficien-
cies in the underlying trade remedy laws themselves. 34 0 Only eradi-
cating the market distortions and commerical uncertainty caused by
trade remedy laws will provide North American exporters with the
secure access to NAFTA markets which they require to increase their
global competitiveness. Until such substantive changes to trade rem-
edy laws are undertaken, any criticism of the Chapter 19 system for its
inability to provide NAFTA exporters with secure market access will
be misplaced.
340 For a timely examination of proposals to reform domestic trade remedy laws, see Thomas
M. Boddez and Michael J. Trebilcock, The Case for Liberalizing Trade Remedy Laws in North
America, 4 Minn. I. Glob. Tr. 1 (1995).
